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INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES:   
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
 
By James E. Pfander* and David R. Pekarek Krohn** 
ABSTRACT 
Although the nineteenth century’s final judgment rule no longer represents 
an absolute barrier to interlocutory appellate review, scholars disagree about what 
should take its place.  Some favor a regime of discretionary interlocutory review, 
with power conferred on appellate courts to select issues that warrant intervention.  
Others reject discretionary review as a waste of appellate resources and call upon 
the rule makers to identify specific categories of non-final orders that always 
warrant review.  While the Supreme Court’s collateral order doctrine bears some 
similarity to this process of categorization, the Court may have called a halt to the 
judicial recognition of new categories in its 2009 decision in Mohawk Industries, 
Inc. v. Carpenter. 
In this Article, we suggest a new approach to interlocutory review that 
combines elements of discretion and categorization.  We argue that the district 
court should be empowered to certify a question for interlocutory review 
(categorically) whenever the parties to the litigation so agree (in the exercise of 
joint discretion).  Drawing on the case-selection literature, we show that the 
parties will often share a financial interest in interlocutory review where they 
recognize that a decisive issue of law will survive any trial court disposition.  
Where the costs of preparing the case for trial are substantial and the risks of 
appellate invalidation significant, the parties have more to gain than lose through 
appellate review.  What’s more, the orders chosen by agreement of the parties 
make good candidates for immediate appellate review.  Agreed-upon review will 
occur only as to issues that the parties regard as presenting close questions that the 
jury cannot settle. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the comparatively simple world of the nineteenth century, the final 
judgment rule worked reasonably well as a means of regulating access to 
appellate review.1  Much civil litigation involved two opposing parties and many 
cases went to trial, usually before a jury.2  The final judgment rule deferred 
                                                            
1 The final judgment rule appeared in the Judiciary Act of 1789, both as a limitation on appellate 
review in the federal system and as a limit on Supreme Court review of state court decisions.  See 
An Act to Establish Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 73, §§ 22, 25 (1789) 
(allowing review of “final decrees and judgments” of the federal district courts and review by writ 
of error of a “final judgment or decree” of the state courts).  The Judiciary Act applied the final 
judgment rule to both of the two most common modes of appellate review -- writ of error review 
for judgments at common law and review by way of appeal for decrees in equity and admiralty.  
On the origins of the writ of error and its limitation of the scope of review to legal errors apparent 
on the face of the record of the lower court, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 136-38 (4th ed. 2002).  The appeal, by contrast, brought the whole case before  
the appellate court and did not limit the scope of review to issues of law.  See id. at 138-41.  See 
generally Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932) 
(tracing the origins and operation of the final judgment rule in the early republic); ROBERT L. 
STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1989) (describing modern practice). 
2 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 459, 462 Table 1 Civil Trials in U.S. 
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appellate oversight until the trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict3 
(except in the rare cases that warranted supervisory review through mandamus or 
other common law writs).4  Parties focused their efforts on winning at trial in the 
district court and sought review only when errors appeared on the record.5  The 
common law writ of error, the preferred vehicle for securing appellate review of 
jury verdicts in the federal system, limited review to issues of law and preserved 
the jury’s role in the determination of factual questions.6 
 Two centuries on, much has changed.  Today, many questions that juries 
once decided have been transformed into issues of law.7  Such legal questions no 
                                                                                                                                                                  
District Courts at 10-Year Intervals, 1962–2002 (2004) (civil trials declined from 11.5% of 
dispositions in 1962 to 1.8% of dispositions in 2002 and civil jury trials declined from 5.5% of 
dispositions in 1962 to 1.2% in 2002). 
3 For the current statement of the final judgment rule, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of 
appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States”); § 1295 
(Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over final decisions arising under certain subject matter, including 
patents, as well as final decisions of United States Claims Court)).  See 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET 
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 202.02–04 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). 
4 For an overview of the origins of the supervisory writs, see James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-
Stripping and the Supreme Court=s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1433 
(2000).  See 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 204.06 (extraordinary writs available under 
“extraordinary circumstances” to review pretrial orders). 
5 See 8 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 39App.100 (at common law, writ of error reviewed only 
questions of law appearing on the face of the record). 
6 See id. (common law writ of error unable to review, absent legislation, even questions of fact 
raised in bench trial). 
7 See e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (defining patent 
claim construction as a question of law); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (whether inference of conspiracy is reasonable based on 
facts in antitrust action is question of law); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (question of 
qualified immunity is a question of law).  In the 1980’s, Martin Louis noted a similar concern with 
the rise of decisions that combine questions of fact and law, or “ultimate facts.”  Martin B. Louis, 
Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A 
Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 
N.C. L. REV. 993, 1002 (1986).  Professor Louis noted that some ultimate facts have been 
denominated questions of law because they were “regarded as too sensitive or too important to be 
entrusted to juries.”  Id. at 1004.  While Professor Louis considered the ability to reclassify 
questions of fact into questions of law as “a sword that appellate judges wear but seldom actually 
draw,” id. at 1028–29, it seems that they have now begun to wield it with greater frequency. 
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longer disappear into the black box of jury deliberations; instead, they persistently 
demand appellate review.8  In addition, modern litigation has grown a good deal 
more complex and variegated; complaints identify more parties and more theories 
of recovery, and often reach across borders to bring non-resident defendants 
before the court.9  With this growth in the size and complexity of litigation, 
modern procedural systems now provide managerial judges, extensive discovery, 
and forms of motions practice that substantially define the contours of the claims 
and the prospects for recovery.10  Rising settlement rates, either through 
negotiation or alternative forms of dispute resolution, mean that fewer cases go to 
trial today as a percentage of those filed in federal court.11 
                                                            
8 See Cybor Corp., v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“claim 
construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on appeal”); Bradley v. Brown, 
42 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1994) (application of the Daubert framework subject to de novo review 
in court of appeals).  See also Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve 
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, District Court Judges] 
(“[A]ccording to the Federal Circuit, the district court claim constructions were wrong 28% of the 
time.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 247 (2005) (reversal rate of claim construction is 
getting worse). 
9 See RICHARD L. MARCUS AND EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 2–7  (3d Ed. 1998) (discussing “The 
Metamorphosis of Litigation”); Daniel J. Meador, A Perspective on Change in the Litigation 
System, 49 ALA. L. REV. 7 (1997) (discussing developments in the litigation system that have 
made litigation more complex); Mass Tort Working Group, Report on Mass Tort Litigation, 187 
F.R.D. 293, 299 (1999) (“In the absence of reform, these problems are more likely to increase than 
to abate.  Many believe that only the subtle exercise of discretion by knowledgeable and creative 
trial judges has protected the judicial process from more substantial problems resulting from mass 
tort litigation.”). 
10 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 374 (1982) (describing a 
growing judicial role in supervising case preparation and encouraging settlement); see also Abram 
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976)  
(discussing changes in the role of the judge since the 19th century); David F. Herr, Annotated 
Manual for Complex Litigation, Introduction (4th ed. updated May 2009) (noting the increased 
responsibilities placed on trial judges by, among other things, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370 
(1996)). 
11 See Galanter, supra 2, at 515 (rise in settlement one reason for decline in trials); Marc Galanter 
and Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (noting the ways that parties are encouraged to settle); but see Gillian 
K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Non-Trial Adjudications and 
Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition Of Federal Civil Cases 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 705, 711–12 (2004) (noting the possibility that settlement rate dropped between 1970 and 
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 With the growing influence of managerial judges, the transformation of 
questions of fact into questions of law, and the rise of settlement, the final 
judgment rule no longer provides an entirely satisfactory trigger for the exercise 
of appellate oversight.12  While the requirement of a final order continues to 
control the timing of the review of most actions for damages, pressure for 
expanded interlocutory review has led to a variety of important changes.13  Thus, 
Congress has expanded interlocutory review directly, by creating the certification 
mechanism in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).14  Congress has also acted indirectly to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2000).  See also Martin Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the 
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (2005).  See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (if offer of judgment 
by defendant is rejected, plaintiff will be liable for some court costs if judgment is not more 
favorable than unaccepted offer); Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers Of 
Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561 
(2008) (challenging the “universally accepted [view] that Rule 68 is meant to encourage 
settlements . . . .”). 
12 See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 83 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (while settlement reduces 
dockets, it is problematic because, inter alia, “it renders subsequent judicial involvement 
troublesome”).  See Howard B. Eisenberg and Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review 
of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999); 
Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175 (2001); Robert J.Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by 
Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993); Craig Allen Nard, 
Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 357 
(2001) (proposing that the Federal Circuit should “be more receptive to adjudicating interlocutory 
orders arising from Markman hearings.”); Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to 
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89 (1975); Michael E. Solimine, 
Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (1990); 
Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007). 
13 See Paul D. Carrington, Towards a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 168–69 (1984) (proposing a statutory change similar to what was later 
adopted as 28 U.S.C § 1292(e)); Redish, supra note 12, at 91–92 (arguing that the current 
exceptions to the finality rule “do not adequately serve the interests of justice in many instances.”). 
14 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).  See also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 203.31.  Section 
1292(b) allows the district court to certify appeals to the Courts of Appeals when the “order 
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation . . . .”  § 1292(b).  The appellate court, however, has the discretion to 
deny such appeals “for any reason, including docket congestion.”  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978).  Section 1292(b) suffers, therefore, from the issue of double discretion, 
requiring the district court and appellate court to agree on the need for immediate review.  
Appellate courts have been reluctant to take appeals under § 1292(b).  See Nystrom v. TREX, Inc., 
339 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (declaring that review of claim construction orders under § 
1292(b) will rarely be granted); Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 957 F.2d 1431, 1438 (7th Cir. 
1992) (recounting a colloquy between the district judge and the parties where the judge  lamented 
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authorize federal rule makers to craft new rules for expanded interlocutory 
review.15  Federal rule makers, for their part, have accepted this new delegation of 
authority with modest enthusiasm; amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure empower the appellate courts to conduct discretionary review of 
class certification decisions.16   
                                                                                                                                                                  
that he “can never get the Seventh Circuit to take an interlocutory appeal” under § 1292(b) or Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(b) after trying “many, many times.”); Erin B. Kaheny, The nature of circuit court 
gatekeeping decisions, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 129, 149 (2010) (circuit law regarding threshold 
gatekeeping appears to influence judges votes on threshold issues); Solimine, supra note 12, at 
1201 (high refusal rate of courts of appeals to provide review “reflects a high level of reluctance to 
utilize section 1292(b) appeals).  Noting that review of orders certified under § 1292(b) is 
“surprisingly low,” Timothy Glynn has suggested that § 1292(b) be amended to accept certified 
appeals unless certification constituted abuse of discretion by the district court.  See Glynn, supra 
note 12, at 246, 259. 
15 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006) (“The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with 
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of 
appeals that is not otherwise provided for . . . .”).  See also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 
203.34 (Section 1292(e) is constitutional because it allows rule makers to define “when appeals 
may be taken, which is an issue apart from the [congressional] power to confer original 
jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.”) (citing Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 
973–974 (5th Cir. 2000)); Amy E. Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other Concepts: A Short 
Course in Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 43, 50 n. 28 (2005) (predicting that “[t]he 
number of exceptions [to the final order rule] may well increase in the future” due to § 1292(e)); 
Laura J. Hines, Mirroring or Muscling: An Examination of State Class Action Appellate 
Rulemaking, 58 KANSAS L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2010) (1292(e) “laid foundation for the only 
exercise of this new rulemaking authority thus far, Rule 23(f)); Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing 
Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2007) (noting that “[t]his rulemaking 
authority has remained largely dormant . . . .”). 
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  See also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 203.34; 7B CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1802.2 
(3d ed.).  Rule 23(f) provides that the court of appeals “may permit” interlocutory review of an 
order granting or denying class-action certification.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).  The courts of appeals 
have, however, been reluctant to exercise this authority.  See In re Sumitomo Copper, 262 F.3d 
134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (imposing requirements for the interlocutory review of class-certification 
rulings that “will rarely be met.”); Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note 
on Law and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277 (2008) (empirical study that finds 
that “it does not appear that the courts are accepting most [Rule 23(f)] petitions.”)  The Second 
Circuit’s response to Rule 23(f) shows the problem with allowing unfettered discretionary review 
over a narrow area of concern.  See Glynn, supra note 12, at 260 (discussing the problems with 
discretionary review).  Even as the rule makers expressed a desire for increased supervision over a 
specific area of law, the courts of appeals hesitate to provide that supervision.  For example, the 
rule makers specifically distinguished 23(f) from certified appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in 
that appeals under 23(f) do not need to involve a controlling question of unsettled law.  Committee 
Notes to 1998 Amendments, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f); see also Hines, supra note 15, at 1030–35 
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The Supreme Court has played a role as well.  The Court has broadened 
the collateral order doctrine to allow interlocutory review of a variety of matters 
that it has deemed both relatively important and relatively distinct from the 
merits-based questions that normally come to appellate courts after a final 
judgment.17  In addition, the Court has fashioned significant exceptions in 
statutory provisions that would otherwise foreclose interlocutory review of certain 
orders.  For example, the Court has ruled that the flat ban on interlocutory review 
of remand orders in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) does not bar all such appellate review.18  
As a result, the Court has frequently struggled in recent years to define access to 
appellate review of remand orders.19 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(summarizing history of 23(f)).  The Second Circuit, however, restored such a requirement by 
requiring either “(1) that the certification order will effectively terminate the litigation and there 
has been a substantial showing that the district court's decision is questionable, or (2) that the 
certification order implicates a legal question about which there is a compelling need for 
immediate resolution.”  Sumitomo Copper, 262 F.3d at 139. 
17 While the collateral order doctrine provides for review that appears to be interlocutory in nature, 
it “is not considered an exception to the final judgment rule, but rather a practical construction of 
the rule.”  19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 202.07 (citing Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop 
Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994)), but see 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, at § 
3911 (“The only finality required is that the district court have made its final determination of the 
matter in question.”); id. at § 3524.6 (describing collateral order doctrine as allowing “appeal of 
interlocutory issues under limited circumstances.”).  The Court originally applied the collateral 
order doctrine in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (finding decision 
final because it “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted 
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require 
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”).  The collateral order 
doctrine has since been applied to orders denying claims of sovereign immunity, Puerto Rico 
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993), and official immunity, 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (qualified official immunity from Bivens liability).  The 
Court has also embraced the collateral order doctrine as the proper vehicle for review of some 
remand orders.  See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996).  Recently, 
however, the Court has begun applying the doctrine more narrowly.  See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 
345 (2005) (doctrine does not apply to order denying motion to dismiss on judgment bar grounds); 
Digital Equipment Corp., 511 U.S. at 867 (doctrine does not apply to order refusing to give effect 
to settlement agreement).  In the most recent case on the issue, the Court indicates that it is 
unlikely to expand the collateral order doctrine further.  See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 
558 U.S. ___ (2009) (doctrine does not apply to disclosure order involving information protected 
by the attorney-client privilege).   
18 See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (Section 1447(d) only bars appellate 
review of remands based on § 1447(c)). 
19 Compare Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. 551 U.S. 224 (2007) (barring appellate 
review of remand order) with Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1862 (2009) 
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 Noting the Court’s efforts to define its parameters, scholars have 
suggested a variety of competing approaches to the proper scope of interlocutory 
review.20  Taking a pragmatic approach to appellate review, Professor Martin 
Redish argues that courts should weigh the likely costs of deferring review against 
the benefits that immediate review can provide.21  Professor Redish rightly notes 
that interlocutory appellate review can sometimes correct serious mistakes at the 
trial level, and thus avoid the costs associated with an unnecessary trial.22  On the 
other hand, interlocutory review can result in appellate oversight that fails to 
address any serious errors and serves only to delay the ultimate resolution of the 
claim.  Redish suggests that the appellate courts exercise discretion in weighing 
the costs and benefits associated with interlocutory review.  Professor Ed Cooper, 
among others, has also expressed some support for a regime of discretionary 
review.23 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(allowing appellate review of remand order).  For an assessment of developments, see James E. 
Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders:  Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme 
Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2010). 
20 See supra note 12. 
21 Redish, supra note 12. 
22 Id. at 98.  See also Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, 
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 156, 157 (1984) (“serious consequences” of postponing review of 
trial court ruling include that “an error may so taint subsequent proceedings as to require reversal 
and further proceedings[, which] may not only represent an expensive duplication of effort, but 
may themselves be distorted beyond repair by the events of the first trial.”).  The effects of delay 
may, in fact, go beyond the particular dispute.  See id. at 158 (noting that if an unreviewed 
incorrect trial court ruling may be dissipated by further trial court proceedings and the “appellate 
courts may be deprived of the opportunity to clarify and improve the law on matters that 
repeatedly evade review.”). 
23 Cooper, supra note 22.  Professor Cooper would accord greater discretion to the courts as they 
gain competence.  He argues that without “mature” judicial institutions, especially at the district 
court level, rules that provide for as-of-right interlocutory review may be necessary, even if those 
rules are extremely complex.  Id. at 159.   But at some point these rules may become “so complex 
and so shifting that they cannot be contained in any set of elaborate rules” and that we should 
consider whether “our institutions have matured to the point at which discretion can be substituted 
for some part of the rules.”  Id. at 158.  Professor Cooper also argues that the level of the court 
exercising discretion should reflect the quality of the judiciary at each level.  Id. at 159.  If trial 
judges show themselves to be “much like appellate judges in ability and temperament,” they might 
view “appellate judges as a resource to be invoked whenever immediate review promises to 
facilitate the speediest, most just, and most efficient disposition of litigation.”  Id.  Professor 
Cooper’s view resembles Professor Redish’s in that both believe the goal should be to have simple 
rules that provide for discretionary review.  Robert Martineau has argued against expanding the 
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 Other scholars, by contrast, defend a categorical approach to interlocutory 
review.24  Rather than relying on the exercise of case-by-case discretion, these 
scholars argue that the system of interlocutory review should attempt to identify 
specific orders that warrant review in every case.25  Orders falling within the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
exceptions to the finality requirement by rule, and for wide-ranging discretion in the appellate 
courts to accept or reject interlocutory appeals.  Martineau, supra note 12.  He specifically 
endorsed the approach of the American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to Appellate Courts, 
codified in Wisconsin.  Id. at 776.  The ABA approach has been also been supported by others as 
the best approach to interlocutory review.  See Eisenberg & Morrison, Discretionary Appellate 
Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the Rules, supra note 12; John C. Nagel, Note: 
Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review, 44 
DUKE L.J. 200 (1994).  The ABA approach gives the appellate courts discretion to hear non-final 
orders if the appeal will “(a) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further 
proceedings in the litigation; (b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury; or (c) 
Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration of justice.”  ABA Standards Relating 
to Appellate Courts (updated 1994).  While the factors for interlocutory appeal are similar to § 
1292(b), there are three important differences.  First, they are disjunctive requirements, so that 
interlocutory review can be granted if any individual factor is satisfied.  Second, they include a 
broad factor relating to irreparable harm.  Third, they do not require the district court to certify the 
appeal, placing all of the discretion in the hands of the appellate courts.  The assignment of such 
wide-ranging discretion to the courts of appeals, however, poses two problems.  First, it does not 
address the reluctance of appellate courts to provide interlocutory review. See supra note 14.  
Second, decisions rejecting immediate review may not give future litigants enough clarification 
about when interlocutory review will be allowed.  See, e.g., K.W. v. Banas, 191 Wis.2d 354 (Wis. 
App. 1995) (rejecting interlocutory review without explanation except that “the court concludes 
that the petition does not meet the criteria for granting permissive appeal.”). 
24 See Glynn, supra note 12, at 259 (recommending that the rule makers provide for interlocutory 
review of “problem areas,” where the lack of interlocutory review (1) has left the law unclear or 
underdeveloped, and (2) inflicts severe irreparable harm on one of the parties.).  Paul Carrington 
suggested a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, which had a three-fold approach to revising 
interlocutory review that relies heavily on the categorical approach.  Carrington, supra note 13, at 
168–69.  First, his proposed act would tighten the final judgment rule by making a final decision 
one “set forth on a separate document, manifesting the intent of the district court that proceedings 
in the case be thereby terminated save for the taxation of costs or enforcement proceedings, and 
entered on the docket of the district court.”  Id.  Second, he proposed a statutory revision similar to 
the eventually adopted § 1292(e) that would “make explicit that the rulemaking power does extend 
to the specification of appealable interlocutory decisions . . . .”  Id.  Third, the act would explicitly 
allow for interlocutory review where it was “essential to protect substantial rights which cannot be 
effectively enforced on review after final decision.”  Id. at 167.  The purpose of this last revision 
was to eliminate the “necessity for strained interpretations of finality . . . and . . .use of 
extraordinary writs . . . as an alternative to appeal.”  Id. at 168.  Those supporting discretionary 
review raise the concern that rule based interlocutory review will not provide the needed flexibility 
in the courts of appeals to manage their own case load and that rules are likely to be either over- or 
under-inclusive.  See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 301. 
25 See Glynn, supra note 12, at 259. 
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scope of these previously defined categories would thus enjoy interlocutory 
review as of right and would not require any extended case-by-case analysis at the 
jurisdictional threshold.26  This categorical approach resembles the Supreme 
Court’s collateral order doctrine, which provides as-of-right interlocutory review 
over orders falling within the scope of the doctrine.27  The Court’s categorical 
thinking comes through quite clearly in its decisions:  it has reminded us that 
collateral order analysis should focus not on “individualized jurisdictional” 
issues28 but on “the entire category to which a claim belongs.”29  Scholars who 
support the categorical approach often propose to rely on rule makers to identify 
relatively discrete orders for which the costs and benefits favor immediate review.  
For example, both Professor Paul Carrington, and the American Law Institute’s 
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, would rely on the rule makers to identify 
the categories of orders to which interlocutory review would apply.30  Similarly, 
Professor Timothy Glynn has suggested that the rule makers should identify 
“problem areas” and create rules to allow interlocutory review in those narrow 
areas.31 
 Critics of the categorical approach have expressed deep skepticism about 
the prospects for developing a set of criteria with which to identify proper 
                                                            
26 See Carrington, supra note 13, at 170 (the law treats ripeness and timeliness of appeals as 
jurisdictional is “a fetish which serves no significant systematic interest.”);  Glynn, supra note 12, 
at 263 (proposing review of class certification orders that could only be dismissed under an abuse 
of discretion standard).. 
27 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  Because the orders under the collateral order 
doctrine are treated as final, litigants receive review as a matter of right.  28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).  
See also Glynn, supra note 14 at 192–93 (discussing the collateral order doctrine). 
28 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay et al., 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978). 
29 Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994). 
30 See Carrington, supra note 13; AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 
465, 495 (2004) (recommending a revised 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) that would give rule makers 
control over when to allow appellate review over remand orders).  The commentary for the 
proposed removal statute explains that the rule makers are in the best position to provide the 
needed “flexibility” by not requiring statutory amendment.  FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION 
PROJECT at 495.  The American Law Institute project retains, however, a measure of discretionary 
review for extraordinary cases.  See id. at 465, 495 (precluding as-of-right review but leaving 
appellate courts to use extraordinary writs to review remand orders “free of any putative 
restriction”). 
31 See Glynn, supra note 12 at 259–60. 
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subjects for interlocutory review.32  Professors Eisenberg and Morrison doubt that 
the rule makers can identify orders by category that will always warrant 
interlocutory review.33  Experience with the collateral order doctrine tends to bear 
out this contention; the recognition of a right to interlocutory review can attract 
some relatively dubious appeals.34  Similarly, the Court’s approach to the 
interlocutory review of remand orders can sometimes result in the review of 
matters that many observers, including the Justices themselves, would not regard 
as worthy candidates for appellate intervention.35  This skepticism about the 
ability of rule makers to define deserving orders by category may tend to 
encourage reliance on discretionary modes of review as a way to weed out routine 
and undeserving appeals.  Eisenberg and Morrison, and Professor Michael 
Solimine, join in the call for review based on the exercise of discretion.36 
 Apart from questions about the proper balance between categorical rules 
and discretionary standards, debates over interlocutory review feature widespread 
disagreement about who should fashion and apply the rules.  At various times, 
Congress, courts, and the rule makers have all taken responsibility for crafting 
rules of interlocutory review.37  The rules differ not only in their institutional 
origins but also in the level of the court system that takes the lead in determining 
the existence of appellate jurisdiction.  In some cases, the district courts can 
exercise discretionary control over appellate review, perhaps by entering a partial 
                                                            
32 See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 296–97 (expressing concern that criteria would be 
both broad and vague).  Professors Eisenberg and Morrison make the additional point that 
appellate courts might construe jurisdictional grants narrowly, allowing, in effect, for discretionary 
denial of the appeal.  Id. 
33 See id. at 295 (identifying areas of disagreement about when to allow interlocutory review). 
34 Pfander, supra note 19, at ___ (noting the growth in appeals from remand orders). 
35 See Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1869 (2009) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (noting that “something is wrong” when, as appears to be the case in the context of 
remand orders under § 1447, review is permitted “in an instance where that decision is unlikely to 
be wrong and where a wrong decision is unlikely to work serious harm” but forbidden “in an 
instance where that decision may well be wrong and where a wrong decision could work 
considerable harm.”). 
36 See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12; Solimine, supra note 12. 
37 See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text (congressional implementation of § 1292(b)); 
supra note 17 and accompanying text (judicial creation of collateral order doctrine); supra note 16 
(interlocutory review of class certification created by rule makers). 
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summary judgment under Rule 54 and finding no just cause for delay.38  In other 
cases, discretionary review requires combined action at both the district and 
circuit court levels; section 1292(b) certifications fall into this category.39  Finally, 
some forms of interlocutory review, such as class action certification review40 and 
mandamus review,41 require only that the appellate court agree to hear the 
matter;42 district courts have no role to play in facilitating appellate review. 
                                                            
38 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (allowing the district court, when it determines that there is no just 
reason for delay, to enter “final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties,” 
thereby triggering the opportunity for appellate review); 10 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 54.23.  
For an argument favoring discretionary review of orders compelling arbitration, see Pierre H. 
Bergeron, District Courts as Gatekeepers? A New Vision of Appellate Jurisdiction Over Orders 
Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L.J. 1365 (2002).   
39 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (interlocutory order only appealable if district court finds that it 
“order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference 
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation” and the court of appeals “in its discretion, permit[s]” the appeal.).  
See also supra note 14 and accompanying text; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, Commentary to § 3.12 (1994 Ed.) (describing that § 1292(b) 
requires “concurrent permission” of trial and appellate court).  Michael Solimine argues for an 
increased use of § 1292(b), especially in complex litigation such as mass torts.  Solimine, supra 
note 12.  Professor Solimine views § 1292(b) as an underused safety valve of interlocutory review, 
which the appellate courts have reserved for use in “big” cases.  Id. at 1204.  He believes that if 
the statute were “shorn of the . . . requirement [that it only applies to ‘big, exceptional cases,’]” it 
would provide for the needed flexibility without overly burdening the courts of appeals.  Id. at 
1168. 
40 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification . . . .”).  See also supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
41 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions . . . .”).  See 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 204.01 (mandamus 
is included within “all writs” and “is generally used to prevent district judges from exceeding their 
authority . . .”);  Sloan, supra note 15, at 57–59 (mandamus directs district court “to act in a 
manner necessary to fulfill her duties . . . .”); Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An 
Interlocutory Restatement, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 84–85 (1984) (hereinafter 
Restatement) (describing the “supervisory” use of mandamus).  Melissa Waters has argued for an 
expanded use of mandamus to supervise district courts that act more like courts of equity when 
dealing with mass torts.  Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: 
Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527 (2002).  While Professor 
Waters’ approach would allow greater discretionary oversight, it raises questions.  First,  
mandamus originated as a tool for correction of jurisdictional and procedural issues, and has been 
thought less appropriate for a full consideration of the merits of a decision.  Second, reliance on 
mandamus does not take advantage of the strength of the district court in evaluating the need for 
interlocutory review.   See Glynn, supra note 12, at 263 (“[A] district court judge is in the best 
position to determine whether an order is worthy of appellate review.”).  Professor Waters nicely 
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 Recent developments at the Supreme Court suggest that the debate over 
how to structure interlocutory review may be coming to a head.  In Carlsbad 
Technology v. HIF Bio, the Court approved yet another exception to section 
1447(d)’s prohibition against review of remand orders.43  In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Breyer posed sharp questions about the Court’s handling of the doctrine.44  
In particular, Justice Breyer questioned rules that seemingly authorized review of 
mundane problems yet foreclosed review of more serious issues.45  He ended his 
opinion with a call for help from “experts.”46  Similarly, in Mohawk Industries, 
the Court took an exceedingly narrow view of the propriety of fashioning new 
judge-made rules of interlocutory review through the expansion of the collateral 
order doctrine.47  The skeptical assessment in the majority opinion was echoed 
and underscored in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which proclaimed a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
captures the interesting connection between equity and interlocutory review, noting that the 
finality rule  did not historically apply to courts of equity.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 
(interlocutory review available as a matter of right for orders regarding injunctions); Restatement, 
at 82 (“the finality requirement was never well established in equity”); Bergeron supra note 38, at 
1371–72. 
42 Adam Steinman has argued that the All Writs Act allows not just for discretionary writs of 
mandamus, but discretionary appeals as well.  See Steinman, supra note 15, at 1257–58.  He 
further suggests that interlocutory review under the All Writs Act would “situate all interlocutory 
appeals on a more solid textual and doctrinal footing . . . .”  Id. at 1295. 
43 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1862 (2009) (concluding that district court’s discretionary decision to 
remand after declining supplemental jurisdiction is not a dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and does not implicate the ban on review of remand orders in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)–
(d)). 
44 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1869 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]e have held that § 1447 permits 
review of a district court decision in an instance where that decision is unlikely to be wrong and 
where a wrong decision is unlikely to work serious harm. And we have held that § 1447 forbids 
review of a district court decision in an instance where that decision may well be wrong and where 
a wrong decision could work considerable harm. Unless the circumstances I describe are unusual, 
something is wrong. And the fact that we have read other exceptions in the statute's absolute-
sounding language suggests that such circumstances are not all that unusual.”). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (stressing that 
collateral order doctrine is an exception that should not “swallow the general rule” that there 
should be a single appeal from a final judgment, and that “justification for immediate appeal must 
therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation 
concludes.”). 
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more absolutist opposition to judge-made interlocutory review.48  Together, the 
opinions suggest the emergence of a fairly strong preference for the development 
of rules through the rule-making process. 
 In this article, we propose the adoption of a rule of interlocutory review 
that combines features of discretion and categorization.49  In brief, we propose a 
rule that would empower the parties, by consent, to request the district court to 
certify a question for interlocutory review.50  If the district court approved the 
joint request, the party contesting the district court’s order could appeal the 
certified question without first having to secure leave from the appellate court.  
Such a consensual trigger for interlocutory review would rely on the self-interest 
of the parties to identify district court decisions that warrant immediate review.  
The requirement that the district court certify the appeal will allow the district judge 
to maintain some control of the litigation by rejecting potentially disruptive repetitive 
review and screening out cases in which she feels the decision might be modified as the 
proceedings continue.51  Not every district court order would attract the consent of 
the parties, needless to say.  Indeed, we will explore a variety of situations in 
which the parties will predictably disagree about the wisdom of immediate 
appellate review.  But the parties do have obvious financial incentives to weigh 
the costs of going to trial in light of the risk and expense associated with both pre- 
and post-trial appellate reversal.  Self-interest would encourage the parties to 
identify situations where expected trial costs are high, and where the risks of post-
trial appellate court invalidation of the trial court’s interlocutory disposition are 
significant.  In such cases, both parties might well prefer appellate review sooner 
rather than later.  Instead of trying to specify these deserving orders in advance, 
we propose to rely on the parties to cull them from the litigation process. 
                                                            
48 Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (applying the 
collateral order doctrine, even to find that the order does not fall within it “needlessly perpetuates 
a judicial policy that we for many years have criticized and struggled to limit.”).  
49 As explained below, we would recommend use of the rule-making process as the vehicle for 
implementing our proposal because it offers the possibility of ongoing evaluation.  See infra Part 
III. 
50 Such a rule would be authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which allows the creation of rule 
“to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise 
provided for . . . .”).  In other words, we are not proposing that parties be allowed to consent to 
finality, but instead to consent to the review of an interlocutory decision. 
51 In addition, district court certification will ensure that “feigned cases” are weeded out.  See infra 
Part III. 
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 Our proposal, which has not previously appeared in the literature,52 would 
allow the parties to evaluate the economics of their case in deciding whether to 
agree to appellate review and would add something valuable to the modes of 
interlocutory review now available.  For starters, our proposal would operate as a 
matter of right for orders that come within its terms, thus avoiding the expense 
associated with litigation at the appellate court level over the existence of 
appellate jurisdiction.  In addition, our proposal would rely on the parties to 
identify situations in which immediate review can cost-effectively advance the 
resolution of the case.  Happily, the parties’ incentives will often lead them to take 
account of the same factors that would presumably inform an attempt on the part 
of the rule makers to establish criteria for interlocutory review.  But instead of a 
rigid system of categories, with inevitable problems of over- and under-
inclusiveness, the system we envision would allow the parties to tailor the timing 
of appellate review to suit their own situation.  We do not view party autonomy as 
a solution to every problem of appellate oversight and do not advocate its 
adoption to the exclusion of other forms.  But we do think it would add something 
valuable to the tools of interlocutory review now available. 
 Our approach relies on two insights not currently reflected in the appellate 
review literature.  First, our approach hypothesizes that appellate review can 
reduce the systemic costs of dispute resolution, even where the district court did 
not make a clear error in resolving a potentially decisive legal issue.  In 
discussions of pragmatic review, scholars treat appellate review as cost-effective 
in cases where the district court made a clear mistake that would require trial of a 
case that should have been dismissed.53  But we suggest that even close cases may 
                                                            
52 Professor Carrington has argued that the parties be allowed to waive a defect in jurisdiction, 
thus envisioning “appellate jurisdiction conferred by consent of the parties[.]”  Carrington, supra 
note 13, at 170.  We would treat consent not simply as overcoming defects in other modes of 
review but as providing an independent basis for interlocutory appellate review.  Party agreement 
does inform some applications for interlocutory review today.  District courts are more likely to 
certify questions when the parties agree that they meet the test in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  It is also 
“not uncommon for the parties to file a joint or stipulated motion seeking a Rule 54(b) judgment” 
that triggers immediate review.  10 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 54.23.  In addition, district 
courts may work to facilitate review by manufacturing finality (as the appellate court recognized 
in Nystrom v. TREX, 339 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) when the parties agree that such review 
would advance the resolution of the case.  For more on the manufactured finality doctrine, see 
infra note 63.  Finally, some settlement agreements contemplate appellate review and thus reflect 
the parties’ agreement that such review will help resolve the case.  See infra Part III. 
53 See Redish at 13 (“For example, a trial court’s refusal to grant summary judgment, or to deny 
removal from a state court, may require the parties to expend substantial physical, financial and 
emotional effort in the preparation and conduct of a trial which may later prove to have been 
worthless.”).  See also Cooper, supra note 22, at 157 (if an error is not immediately reviewed it 
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benefit from interlocutory review; clarifying a potentially controlling legal 
question can avoid trial costs no matter how the appellate court rules on the 
merits.  Our approach also draws on the insight that we can rely on the parties to 
identify orders that meet the close-question test for interlocutory review.  Party 
control, and district court review, can thus identify a category of interlocutory 
orders for which review makes sense.54  We would thus eliminate the common 
requirement that the appellate court independently agree to hear the appeal.55  By 
eliminating such threshold review, our proposal should further reduce the 
systemic cost of dispute resolution.56 
 Despite its novelty, our suggested reliance on the parties to select orders 
for interlocutory review fits comfortably with two bodies of literature.  One body 
of literature explores the factors that influence the way parties select cases for trial 
and settle cases in the shadow of the law.  Drawing on this literature, we think the 
parties’ self-interest would lead them to identify orders with a substantial 
probability of appellate reversal.  The classic article by Priest and Klein shows 
that the parties will tend to select cases for trial in which they perceive genuine 
uncertainty as to the outcome.57  Weak cases will be weeded out and strong cases 
                                                                                                                                                                  
may “so taint subsequent proceedings as to require reversal and further proceedings.”); Sloan, 
supra note 15, at 53–54 (noting how immediate review of a controlling question of law under § 
1292(b) can be efficient because “an error in the application of a controlling question of law 
results in wasted resources.); Solimine, supra note 36, at 1169 (noting that interlocutory review 
“can save cost and time by shortening, streamlining or terminating the litigation.”). 
54 This addresses the concern raised regarding the categorical approach to interlocutory review that 
“any [] criteria that could be devised [regarding interlocutory review] are, of necessity, both quite 
broad and quite vague.”  Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 297. 
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also supra notes 14, 16. 
56 For an example of the costs of discretionary gatekeeping by appellate courts, see In re 
Sumitomo Copper, 262 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2001) (conducting a detailed review of a class 
certification decision only to find that it did not present issues pressing enough to warrant 
discretionary review). See also supra note 14.  As noted above, Professor Glynn has suggested an 
amendment to § 1292(b) to require the courts of appeals to hear certified appeals absent abuse of 
discretion by the district court.  In some ways, our proposal is more modest, in that with most 
§ 1292(b) appeals, one party opposes the certification.  We are suggesting only that the courts of 
appeals would be required to hear those appeals that neither party opposes and the district court 
certifies as appropriate for immediate review.  
57 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1 (1984).  See also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement 
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH, L. REV. 319 (1991) (empirically 
testing Priest and Klein’s selection hypothesis); Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal 
Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 213 (2007) (“Uncertainty begets the lawsuit.”). 
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may well settle without any need for litigation.58  The same logic will, we believe, 
lead the parties to select cases for interlocutory appellate review in which the 
prospects for appellate reversal are significant.  In other words, a model of party 
autonomy will tend to identify precisely those orders that pose a significant threat 
of appellate reversal and will most likely block resolution through settlement.  A 
second body of literature recognizes and explores the implications of the parties’ 
power to choose a forum for the resolution of their disputes.59  Courts today freely 
enforce forum-selection clauses, whether they call for the resolution of the dispute 
by the publicly-funded court system or by a privately-paid arbitral panel.60  
Parties can exercise their choice of forum at any stage in the process, opting out of 
the civil justice system either before or after the dispute arises.61  Indeed, recent 
developments suggest that the parties can ask a private arbitration panel to 
                                                            
58 See Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 19 (as parties’ likelihood of being wrong about outcome of 
litigation goes down, likelihood of settlement increases). 
59 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
233 (2008); Okuma Kazutake, Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Consolidation of Multiparty and Classwide Arbitration, 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 189 
(2003); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure 
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses 
and the Privatization Of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 52 (1992) (“The rise of forum-
selection clauses is a manifestation of the increasing deference to party autonomy in jurisdictional 
and related matters.”).  In addition to forum selection and alternative dispute resolution, parties 
also have the option of consenting to a jury or bench trial conducted by a magistrate judge.  28 
U.S.C. § 636(c) (2006).  The importance of litigant autonomy grows out of the general individual 
autonomy valued in democratic society.  See Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class 
Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 
1573, 1574 (2007) (“[L]itigant autonomy should be acknowledged as a logical outgrowth of the 
nation's commitment to process-based liberal democratic thought, and therefore a foundational 
element of procedural due process analysis.”). 
60 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding forum-selection clause 
in fine print on back of cruise ticket); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (giving effect to arbitration agreement notwithstanding the fact that it would 
result in piecemeal litigation).  See also Solimine, supra note 12.  For a discussion of how party 
autonomy interacts with arbitration, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The 
Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000) 
(“[C]ourts have largely accepted the party autonomy model, willingly adapting their own 
processes to meet the articulated needs of the litigants.”). 
61 See Redish & Larsen, supra note 59, at 1573 (“[T]he individual litigant's autonomy in deciding 
whether to pursue her claim and if so, how best to conduct that litigation” is “the theoretical 
foundation of the procedural due process guarantee . . . .”). 
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conduct the functional equivalent of appellate review of a judicial decision.62  The 
growing familiarity with party autonomy in the choice of forum suggests that its 
use to select cases for interlocutory review should not prove unduly disruptive or 
controversial. 
 We present our argument for a party-based approach to interlocutory 
review in four parts.  Part II sets forth the basic elements of the argument.  We 
begin with the intuitive case for party-based review, offering a simple 
hypothetical case to explain why the parties might agree on the need for appellate 
intervention.  We next formalize the model of party-based review, drawing on the 
literature that has grown up around the selection of cases for trial.  We find that 
the model predicts that the parties will agree to interlocutory review in cases 
where both parties anticipate relatively high costs associated with taking the case 
to trial, relatively low costs of appellate intervention, and a relatively substantial 
likelihood of appellate reversal.  Appellate review of such orders makes sense to 
the parties because the prospect of post-verdict or final judgment review threatens 
to upset everything that has gone before.  Party-based review makes systemic 
sense because it applies to one identifiable set of orders likely to produce net 
efficiencies for the system of litigation as a whole.  Finally, we collect evidence to 
support our claim that modern litigation often displays the features that will tend 
to produce situations in which the parties (and the system) can profit from agreed 
upon appellate review. 
 Part III of the article considers a variety of objections to our proposal.  We 
first consider objections based upon the policies underlying the final judgment 
rule.  We show that our proposal does not run afoul of the sensible policies of 
avoiding unnecessary, fragmented, or repetitive review.  We next consider an 
objection based on the limits that the case-or-controversy requirements of Article 
III impose on the power of appellate courts to hear feigned or contrived cases and 
to issue advisory opinions.  We show that, with the exception of appellate review 
aimed at purchasing a favorable precedent, party-based review does not present an 
                                                            
62 See Controlling Legal Costs – Law Firms Consider Appellate Arbitration and Consultation, The 
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=February&artYear=201
0&EntryNo=10605.  See also Moffitt, supra note 59, at 475 (proposing customization of the 
appellate experience).  While Professor Moffitt argues for allowing litigants to agree to customize 
the appellate process, the customization he envisions is more related to curtailing, and not 
expanding appellate review.  See id. at 477–78.  The courts of appeals also provide mediation 
programs that provide assistance to parties in settling as an alternative to appellate litigation.  See 
Gilbert J. Ginsburg, Essay: The Case for a Mediation Program in the Federal Circuit, 50 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1379, 1382–87 (2001) (surveying various ADR programs of the courts of appeals). 
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Article III problem.  Parties to a genuine dispute can agree between themselves on 
the need for a determination of their respective rights and obligations without 
depriving the court of its power to issue a declaratory judgment; party agreement 
on the need for judicial resolution does not mean that the dispute lacks the 
genuineness needed to support the exercise of federal judicial power.  Finally, we 
address what we call the incidence problem:  the concern that the proposal will 
produce either too much or too little interlocutory review.  For a variety of 
reasons, we do not believe our proposal will give rise to unbridled interlocutory 
review.  While it’s possible that plaintiffs will prefer to take their cases to trial in 
the face of a threat of appellate reversal, we explain why we doubt that plaintiffs 
will act irrationally and how the parties can structure side-deals that facilitate 
appellate review.  Part IV briefly concludes. 
II. THE CASE FOR PARTY-BASED INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW 
 In this part, we set forth our case for a rule that would allow the parties to 
agree to interlocutory appellate review.  We begin with the most straightforward 
claim:  when one takes account of the prospects for settlement and the costs 
associated with litigation at the district court level, the parties will often have a 
common financial interest in agreeing to interlocutory review of controlling 
questions of law.  Early resolution of such controlling questions can obviate the 
necessity for a trial, can provide important information to shape the way the case 
proceeds to trial, and can eliminate the possibility of a post-trial appellate 
invalidation of the judgment.   One can generalize by saying that review makes 
sense when the parties expect to gain more from legal clarification (and from 
avoiding the costs associated with a flawed or unnecessary trial) than they expect 
to expend in obtaining an appellate resolution.  What’s more, the parties’ financial 
incentives will lead them to agree to interlocutory review in precisely those 
closely divided cases of legal uncertainty in which the systemic interest in the 
low-cost resolution of disputes will argue in favor of interlocutory review.  By 
allowing the parties to identify cost-effective interlocutory review, our proposal 
should improve the overall operation of the dispute resolution system. 
We develop three separate arguments in favor of a party-driven approach 
to interlocutory review.  In the first section of this part, we offer a simple 
hypothetical to illustrate the intuitive case for party autonomy.  We then attempt 
to formalize the intuitive case, drawing on the theoretical literature that has grown 
up around the economics of settlement negotiations.  After setting forth the 
intuitive and theoretical cases for party autonomy, the third section develops 
empirical support for the proposal.  For starters, we explore a number of cases in 
which it appears that something like party-based appellate review may already be 
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occurring in the federal courts.  Indeed, in the field of patent litigation and 
elsewhere, federal courts have responded to the demand for interlocutory review 
by acting to facilitate review through “manufactured finality” doctrines that can 
be quite difficult to square with current law.63  In addition, we show that the 
federal courts have transformed issues of fact into questions of law that require 
judicial resolution.  This trend toward shifting issues from jury to judge—or what 
                                                            
63 Manufactured finality involves the voluntary dismissal of “peripheral” claims in district court 
after pre-trial resolution of the “central or core” claim, thus rendering the dismissal “dispositive, 
final, and appealable.”.  Rebecca A. Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by "Manufacturing" A 
Final Judgment Through Voluntary Dismissal of Peripheral Claims, 48 MERCER L. REV. 979, 982 
(1997).  Though apparently straightforward, the manufactured finality doctrine has divided the 
circuits over the use of a without-prejudice dismissal of the peripheral claims.  See Doe v. U.S., 
513 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the split among circuits).  The Second, Fifth, and 
Eleventh circuits do not allow a without-prejudice dismissal to manufacture the needed finality.  
See id. (citing Rabbi Jacob Joseph Sch. v. Province of Mendoza, 425 F.3d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Marshall v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 378 F.3d 495, 499–500 (5th Cir. 2004); State Treasurer v. 
Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 11 (11th Cir. 1999)).  The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal circuits do allow, at 
least in some situations, a without-prejudice dismissal to create the necessary finality for 
immediate review.  See id. (citing James v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 
2002); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Thomas Auto Co., 939 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1991); Hicks v. NLO, 
Inc., 825 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987)).  The Seventh Circuit focuses on whether the parties and 
district court have “schemed to create jurisdiction over an essentially interlocutory appeal.”  James 
v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Kaufmann, 985 
F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1993) (refusing appeal); Horwitz v. Alloy Auto Co., 957 F.2d 1431 (7th Cir. 
1992) (refusing appeal); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266 
& n.1 (7th Cir. 1976) (allowing appeal)).  At the suggestion of Mark Levy, the Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States has taken up the 
manufactured finality issue.  See Mark I. Levy, Manufactured Finality, National Law Journal 
(May 5, 2008); Agenda Book for April 16-17, 2009 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate 
Rules, p. 19.  While the manufactured finality doctrine is narrower than our proposal for 
interlocutory appeal by agreement, Judge Carl Stewart believes it may be necessary to address the 
issue that there are “cases in which everybody—the parties and the trial judge—wants to send a 
case up to the court of appeals quickly.”  Agenda Book for April 16-17, 2009 Meeting of Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules, p. 38 (draft minutes from January 12-13, 2009 Meeting 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Standing Committee).  Professor Bergeron’s 
proposal regarding orders compelling arbitration can also be seen as an implementation of the 
manufactured finality doctrine through without-prejudice dismissal.  See Bergeron, supra note 38 
(proposing that a district court dismisses litigation simultaneously with ordering arbitration if it 
feels that immediate review would be important).  Professor Bergeron notes, however, that under 
the Federal Arbitration Act there appears to be circuit uniformity regarding the finality of without-
prejudice dismissals after compelling arbitration.  See id. at 1383.  This is because a with-prejudice 
dismissal might have the effect of preventing the parties from re-entering court to secure and 
enforce a judgment on the arbitration award.  See Interactive Flight Technologies, Inc. v. Swissair 
Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 249 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal of district court was 
only without-prejudice in the sense that it was not meant to preclude parties from enter judgment 
after completing arbitration). 
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we call judicialization—creates a growing demand for interlocutory review, as 
parties seek the resolution of decisive questions by the appellate court—the only 
institution that can settle the issue.  Finally, we show that many fields of complex 
litigation display the financial characteristics (expensive trial costs relative to the 
costs of appellate review) that would tend to make party-based interlocutory 
review viable.  
A. The Intuitive Case for Party Autonomy 
 To see the intuition behind our proposal, consider a garden variety motion 
to dismiss an action on statute-of-limitations grounds.64  Under current law, the 
district court’s rejection of such a threshold motion would constitute a non-final 
order and would not be subject to immediate appellate review.65  Such an 
application of the final judgment rule makes sense in most situations.  Defendants 
almost always prefer interlocutory review:  a successful appeal might secure the 
action’s dismissal and will often, in the meantime, delay the discovery and trial 
phases of the litigation.66  The defendants’ predictable desire for delay means that 
allowing routine or categorical review of such orders does not make sense; 
defendants could seek review even in cases where the only goal was to delay and 
where there was only the slightest prospect of appellate reversal.  But despite the 
general rule, interlocutory review may be appropriate in cases where the 
defendant has a substantial prospect of success on appeal; interlocutory review 
could sustain the limitations defense, thus obviating the need for further 
                                                            
64 The validity of a statute-of-limitations defense may turn on a preliminary question of law.  See 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 629 (2007) (petitioner/plaintiff 
argued that each paycheck she received based on previous discriminatory pay discrimination was a 
fresh violation of equal employment laws for statute-of-limitations purposes); Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 743 (1980) (petitioner/plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that, although 
state law would have foreclosed the case, the limitations clock was tolled by compliance with 
federal rules). 
65 See Parmar v. Jeetish Imports, Inc., 180 F.3d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “the denial of 
a statute-of-limitations defense may effectively be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment” and 
awarding sanctions based on defendant’s attempt to receive immediate review of motion to 
dismiss based on the statute of limitations).  See also Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 
Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994) (rejecting the view that a limitations defense should be regarded as a 
collateral order that would warrant interlocutory review); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 551 
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (denial of motion to dismiss on 
statute-of-limitations grounds would only be immediately reviewable if such a defense conferred 
the right not to be sued.). 
66 See Solimine, supra note 36, at 1168 (noting that the final judgment rule “discourages the delay 
of trial proceedings and harassment of party opponents . . . .”). 
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proceedings at the trial level.  Even if the appellate court were to affirm the 
rejection of the defense and remand for trial, the decision may clear the way for a 
settlement that would have been difficult to reach so long as the limitations 
defense remained unresolved.  Especially when appellate review costs less than 
the trials avoided or decisively re-shaped thereby (an assumption that often 
holds),67 review of substantial defenses could make the system more efficient. 
 The trick lies in identifying the cases in which the defendant has a 
sufficiently substantial claim to warrant interlocutory review, given the expected 
costs of trial and appellate review.  Our proposal would rely on the parties to 
identify non-final orders for immediate review.  It may not seem obvious at first 
blush why plaintiffs would ever agree to such review, having overcome a motion 
to dismiss at the district court level.  But return to our hypothetical case and 
consider a situation in which the plaintiff predicts that the trial, though expensive, 
will result in a substantial plaintiff’s verdict that the defendant can attack, perhaps 
successfully, with the limitations defense.  If the plaintiff views the limitations 
defense as substantial, the plaintiff might prefer to litigate that issue right away, 
before incurring the expense necessary to prepare the case for trial.  After all, the 
plaintiff can predict that the defendant will renew the limitations defense on 
appeal from any verdict.  If the plaintiff succeeds in clarifying in advance of trial 
that the limitations defense was properly rejected, the plaintiff will have removed 
an important legal barrier to liability.  Plaintiffs thus have an incentive to agree to 
interlocutory review in precisely the cases where the threat of appellate reversal 
looms relatively large and the costs of seeking interlocutory review seem low in 
comparison to the cost of taking the case to trial.  Indeed, in many cases like the 
one involving the hypothetical limitations defense, the parties may agree to settle 
                                                            
67 The American Intellectual Property Law Association reports that for patent litigation suits with 
between $1,000,000 and $25,000,000 at risk, the median cost of litigation is $1,500,000 through 
the end of discovery, and $2,500,000 inclusive of everything, including trials and appeals.  AM. 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMY SURVEY 2009, at 29 (2009).  Pre-trial 
litigation costs, including discovery are, therefore, the majority of the costs in patent litigation 
suits.  Even if the $1,000,000 post-discovery expense is divided equally between trial and appeal, 
an appeal would still only represent 20% of the total cost of litigation.  See David L. Schwartz, 
Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study Of Claim Construction Reversal Rates In Patent 
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 243 (2008) (noting that the low cost of appeal and the high overall 
stakes in patent cases mean that most cases are appealed).  See also SCOTT BARCLAY, AN 
APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASES 48–49 (1999) (discussing the cost/benefit 
model for determining whether to appeal and the role of transaction costs—including “nominal” 
appellate court fees and somewhat higher lawyer’s fees—in making that determination); Theodore 
Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-
Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 659, 660 (2004) (appeal rates of judgments 
resulting from trial are twice that of nontribal judgments). 
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the case after the appellate court rules.  Interlocutory review will thus facilitate 
settlement in the shadow of a (newly clarified) law and avoid the cost of trial even 
in cases where the appellate court affirms the district court’s rejection of the 
defense and remands for further proceedings. 
B. The Formal Case for Party Autonomy 
 One can create a simple model to formalize the intuition underlying the 
exemplary case just described.  Suppose a personal injury claimant has a solid 
case on liability; both the plaintiff and defendant predict that in 90% of cases with 
similar facts, the jury will return a plaintiff’s verdict.  Suppose further that both 
sides reckon the likely jury verdict at a value of 100.  Finally, suppose that both 
sides will face trial costs of 10 to take the case to the jury.  In such a simplified 
world, we can sketch the likely settlement range.  The plaintiff should accept any 
amount above 80, representing the expected value of the verdict less the cost of 
taking the case to trial (costs that the plaintiff will avoid by settling before trial) 
[(.9 x 100) – 10 = 80].  The defendant should be willing to pay any amount less 
than 100, representing the expected value of the verdict plus the defendant’s 
expected cost of taking the case to trial [(.9 x 100) + 10 = 100].  Such a case 
should settle between 80 and 100, a range scholars sometimes describe as the 
zone of potential agreement (ZOPA).68 
                                                            
68 See Donald R. Philbin, Jr., The One Minute Manager Prepares for Mediation: A 
Multidisciplanary Approach to Negotiation Preparation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 249, 273 
(2008) (discussing how valuation affects the ZOPA).  Two general theoretical frameworks help 
analyze the interaction of factors bearing on settlement.  See Gross & Syverud, supra note 57, at 
321.  The first, sometimes referred to as the “expectations framework,” posits that parties have 
independent expectations of the likelihood of success of a suit and the damages at issue.  See 
Priest & Klein, supra note 57; George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985).  Under this framework, settlement occurs if the expected judgments of 
each party are close enough to allow settlement.  The theory assumes that the parties evaluate the 
cost of trial differently in determining what would be an acceptable settlement.  The plaintiff’s 
minimum settlement demand subtracts the plaintiff’s litigation costs from the expected judgment.  
The defendant’s maximum settlement offer, on the other hand, represents the expected judgment 
plus the litigation costs.  The second approach to determining when settlement is likely to occur 
considers the strategic behavior of the parties during negotiation.  See Robert H. Mnookin & 
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.  950 
(1979); see also Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).  In the strategic approach, the behavior of the 
parties during negotiation can result in a failure to arrive at an agreement prior to trial, 
notwithstanding the fact that their expectations would produce a ZOPA. 
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 The introduction of divergent views on a judicial question, such as the 
admissibility of an expert’s testimony under Daubert,69 can complicate the 
settlement calculus.  Suppose, in the above case, that the claimant and defendant 
have different views of the viability of the claim.  The plaintiff believes he has a 
90% chance of a verdict in his favor, while the defendant believes there is only a 
60% chance of a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.  These divergent views reflect the 
parties’ evaluation of the plaintiff’s medical expert.  While the plaintiff believes 
the expert will sway the jury, the defendant does not believe the testimony meets 
the minimum threshold of reliability needed for admission of expert testimony.70  
Unlike the situation where parties agree on the viability of a claim, the parties will 
no longer be able to settle.  The plaintiff should still accept any amount above 80, 
since he still has the same belief in his success at trial.  The defendant, however, 
will be unwilling to pay more than 70 [(.6 x 100) + 10 = 70].  Because the lowest 
amount the plaintiff will accept exceeds the highest amount the defendant will 
offer, the parties confront a negative ZOPA and cannot reach a settlement.71 
 Imagine the litigation proceeds and the defendant moves to have the 
medical expert disqualified.  The judge, however, deals a blow to the defendant 
by allowing the expert’s testimony.  The plaintiff and defendant both now agree 
that, if the ruling stands, the plaintiff has a 90% chance of succeeding at trial.  If 
there was no chance of appellate reversal of that decision, the parties could now 
settle.72  Settlement, however, must still overcome the parties’ differing views of 
the likelihood that the trial court’s ruling on the expert’s testimony will withstand 
appellate review.  Assume that the plaintiff assesses the likelihood of appellate 
affirmance at 80%, whereas the defendant sees only a 50% chance the higher 
court will uphold the ruling.  To calculate the settlement prospects at this point, 
we consider both the likelihood of a favorable jury verdict as well as the 
likelihood of an order upholding that verdict on appeal.  In addition, both sides 
must take account of the costs of appeal (which we will assume to be 2).  The 
least the plaintiff should be willing to accept is now 60, which is the expected 
                                                            
69 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow [cite] 
70 See infra notes 140–160 and accompanying text. 
71 This is a typical situation where the parties are “mutually optimistic” about their chances of 
success at trial, and can therefore not reach a settlement.  See J.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier, & 
Albert Yoon, Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements 2 (Harvard John M. Olin 
Discussion Paper No. 678, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676404. 
72 In fact, motion practice in general appears to accelarate parties’ ability to settle.  See Christina 
L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement 20 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1649643. 
Review by Party Agreement  25 
value of the verdict [.9 * 100 = 90] multiplied by the plaintiff’s belief that there is 
an 80% chance the verdict will stand after appeal, less the expected trial costs and 
appeal costs [(.8 * 90) – 10 – 2 = 60].73  On the other hand, while the defendant 
evaluates the jury’s verdict at 90, the defendant will offer no more than 57 [(.5 * 
90) + 10 + 2 = 57].  Again, no settlement is possible. 74  
 Assume that the case proceeds to trial, and the court allows the medical 
expert to testify.  Assume further that (as both sides predicted) the jury finds the 
defendant liable and awards damages of 100.  Even now, after a jury verdict, the 
parties will be unable to forgo the appeal and settle.75  The differing assessments 
of the likelihood of appellate court reversal continue to prevent settlement.  The 
plaintiff’s settlement floor will now be 78, the value of the jury’s verdict 
multiplied by the plaintiff’s 80% expectation it will be upheld, less the costs of 
                                                            
73 To keep the model simple, we have assumed that a reversal of the ruling would necessitate the 
reversal of any verdict for the plaintiff and would not occasion a new trial.  If we take account of 
the possibility of a second trial based on an appellate decision, we can see how interlocutory 
review may encourage settlement and, therefore, why parties might consent to immediate review 
in certain situations.  As a party’s expectation of a remand by the appellate court for a new trial 
goes up, so does her expected litigation costs, because she expects to pay for two trials instead of 
one.  Taking this into account could significantly enlarge an existing ZOPA (or create a ZOPA 
where one had not existed previously), as it reduces the minimum amount a plaintiff would accept 
and, at the same time, raises the amount the defendant would offer.  Interlocutory review would be 
especially helpful as the reversal and remand rate approaches 50%.  As with expectations about 
close cases generally, expectations about the outcome of appeal in cases of imperfect foresight are 
more likely to be error prone.  See Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 14–15.  Interlocutory review 
in this situation would significantly lower the likelihood of a new trial by removing concerns 
about reversal on the issue at hand. 
74 Just as the mutual optimism of the parties about the chance for success at trial prevents 
settlement, so does the mutual optimism abou the chance for success at the appellate level.  See 
Prescott et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2. 
75 In general, analyses under the Priest and Klein framework do not separate out trial from appeal, 
except to note that a case that is close enough to go to trial will also likely be close enough to be 
appealed.  See Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 51–52; Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, & 
Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations From The Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to 
the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 240 (1996) (empirical analysis of the 
selection hypothesis in federal appellate cases).  Priest & Klein also note that if the trial judge’s 
views of the law are clearly at odds with those of the appellate court, the parties will “‘reverse’ the 
trial judge privately” by taking that into account in deriving their expectations of a successful suit.  
Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 52.  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 119 (1996) (noting that the observed increase in appeal rates may result 
from growing legal uncertainty, making it more difficult for parties to “converge on the likely 
outcome of an appeal.”). 
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appeal [(.8 * 100) – 2 = 78]. 76  The defendant’s settlement ceiling will now be 52, 
based on the defendant’s view that the appellate court will reverse in 50% of such 
cases [(.5 * 100) + 2 = 52]. 
Now consider the settlement possibilities if, at the point where the district 
court allowed the medical expert’s testimony, interlocutory review were available.  
The interlocutory review would have the effect of reducing the uncertainty 
inherent in the question of law, and parties’ predictions of success would 
converge.  If the appellate court rules in the plaintiff’s favor, upholding the trial 
court’s decision, both sides will now agree that there is a 90% chance of success 
at trial.  This resembles the simple initial case, where both parties believe the 
expected judgment is 90 [.9 *100 = 90] and there is a ZOPA between 80 and 100.  
If the appellate court rules in the defendant’s favor, overruling the trial court and 
rejecting the expert’s testimony, the plaintiff will likely reduce his estimate of 
success at trial to match the defendant’s initial belief that there is a 60% chance of 
success at trial.  In this case, both sides will agree that the expected judgment is 
now 60 [.6 * 100 = 60].  This will create a ZOPA between 50 [(.6 * 100) – 10 = 
50] and 70 [(.6 * 100) + 10].  Knowing that securing a resolution from the 
appellate court in either direction could open up a settlement window, the parties 
might agree to interlocutory review.77  In fact, the availability of interlocutory 
review by consent might encourage the parties to settle before the appeal for 
                                                            
76 The costs of trial are now sunk costs and are therefore not considered.  In addition, the jury’s 
actual judgment replaces both sides’ expected judgment. 
77 Even in the situation where the ZOPA makes settlement possible without interlocutory review, 
there may still be reason for parties to agree on immediate review.  Professor Robert Rhee has 
pointed out that “[c]ertainty obviates litigation, uncertainty begets dispute” and that that parties 
may be willing to spend money to “hedge” against the concern that they are not valuing settlement 
properly.  Rhee, supra note 57, at 254.  In other words, parties may consent to interlocutory 
review simply to better determine the risk of trial, and to make sure they know they are properly 
valuing settlement.  Even if the parties’ initial estimates lead them to believe there is room for 
negotiation, each may still be willing to spend the relatively small cost of an appeal to remove the 
uncertainty and make sure they are not offering (or accepting) more (or less) than they should.  
The sequential nature of appellate decision-making has been noted as a barrier to settlement.  See 
POSNER, supra note 75, at 120.  Allowing parties to consent to interlocutory review could reverse 
the standard sequence—appellate review of specific issue prior to full judgment by the district 
court—and therefore remove, at least partially, that barrier.  Professor Steven Shavell has also 
proposed that allowing litigants the option for shaping their appellate experience—in his case by 
allowing the choice between direct appeal and discretionary review—can reduce uncertainty, and 
therefore promote settlement.  Steven Shavell, On the Design of the Appeals Process: The Optimal 
Use of Discretionary Review versus Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 90 (2010). 
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somewhere in the lower settlement range, with an additional 20 to be paid to the 
plaintiff if the appellate court upholds the trial court ruling.78 
Yet interlocutory review does not make sense in every case.  If the parties’ 
views of the likelihood of success at trial are very different, regardless of the 
outcome of the appeal, interlocutory appeal may not create a ZOPA.  We can 
illustrate that idea by modifying our example such that the allowance of the 
expert’s testimony has little impact on the defendant’s view that there is only a 
60% chance of success at trial.  Then even if the ruling is upheld, the most the 
defendant would offer is 70 [(.6 * 100) + 10 = 70], while the plaintiff would still 
not settle for less than 80 [(.9 * 100) – 10 = 80].  The example illustrates the 
intuitive notion that, where the parties’ assessment of the strength of the defense 
varies widely, they’re unlikely to reach an agreement.  For the same reason, the 
parties have little reason to agree on interlocutory appellate review of the issue:  
the plaintiff would tend to regard the defendant’s proposal for early review as 
aimed at obfuscation and delay. 
This simple model predicts that the parties’ ability to secure interlocutory 
review to gain clarification of a legal question important to the litigation before 
incurring the cost of preparing the case for trial will yield settlement prospects 
that were otherwise unavailable.  Interlocutory review may be especially 
attractive in cases where the parties predict a relatively expensive trial that might 
be negated or decisively re-shaped by appellate review.  When the costs of appeal 
are relatively low in relation to the costs of trial, and appellate resolution of a 
legal question can shape (or re-shape) the trial, the parties will have incentives to 
secure the appellate court’s view before they present the case to the jury.  In the 
next section, we contend that this basic intuition applies across a broad range of 
legal questions.  We show further that the number of legal questions affecting the 
litigation has tended to grow over time; the assertion of greater judicial control 
over the resolution of civil disputes has created a corresponding increase in the 
demand for interlocutory oversight.   
C. The Empirical Case for Party Autonomy 
 Moving from the intuitive and theoretical world to the somewhat messier 
world of the litigated case, we find evidence that the parties agree to seek early 
answers to decisive legal questions and that courts sometimes struggle to provide 
them.  We focus on three situations that illustrate the way the parties and the 
district courts work to procure legal clarification from the appellate courts and the 
                                                            
78 See infra note 188. 
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somewhat inconsistent reception such efforts have received from the appellate 
bench.  
1.   Patent Litigation and Markman Hearings 
 Patent litigation displays many of the characteristics that produce joint 
requests for early appellate intervention.  Patent cases often feature substantial 
claims for damages, expensive trial practice, and relatively inexpensive appellate 
review.79  Patent litigation also produces controlling questions of fact and law, 
such as the judicial “construction” of the patent “claim,” that can play a central 
role in resolving claims of patent infringement and patent invalidity.  At one time, 
issues of patent claim construction were simply sent to the jury, along with the 
claims of infringement and invalidity.  The jury sorted out the scope of the 
patent’s claims in the course of resolving the dispute and appellate review 
followed in due course.  All that changed in 1996, when the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments that 
claim construction issues should be treated as matters of law for the court (rather 
than the jury) to resolve.80  Now district courts routinely conduct “Markman 
hearings” at which the parties litigate claim construction issues in formats that 
“run the gamut from mid-trial sidebar conferences that undergird relevance 
rulings to virtual mini-trials extending over several days and generating extensive 
evidentiary records.”81  The result of such hearings can effectively determine the 
settlement value of the infringement claim.82 
The patent infringement case, Nystrom v. TREX, Inc. illustrates how the 
recognition of a judicial role in claim construction can shape the parties’ demand 
for appellate oversight.  The district court conducted a Markman hearing and 
rendered a decision that was, as a practical matter, fatal to the plaintiff’s theory of 
                                                            
79 See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 243. 
80 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (construing the patent claims 
is a mixed question of law and fact for the court to resolve). 
81 Herr, supra note 10, § 33.222 (quoting MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 
21 (D. Mass. 1998)) (omission omitted). 
82 See id., § 33.22 (“many patent cases are resolved once the claim construction is decided, either 
through summary judgment or settlement . . .”).  To determine if a patent has been infringed, the 
tribunal must decide how broadly to construe the “claims” in the patent.  A patent’s claims act as 
the metes and bounds of the monopoly grant.   See Kimberly A. Moore, District Court Judges, 
supra note 8, at 5 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
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infringement.  Yet the decision did not satisfy the requirements for appellate 
review under the final judgment rule.  The court did not formally reject plaintiff’s 
infringement claim and did not resolve the defendant’s counterclaim of patent 
invalidity.  Lacking a final judgment “which ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,”83 the parties (and the 
district court) sought a mechanism with which to secure interlocutory review.84 
After requesting suggestions from the parties about how to proceed, the 
district court attempted to finalize its judgment by granting a partial summary 
judgment as to certain of the infringement claims and entering a stay pending 
appeal of the remaining allegations.85  The apparent goal of the district court’s 
stay order was to put everything else on hold and trigger review of the Markman 
decision.86  But the Federal Circuit refused to accept this mode of facilitating 
review.87  The stay order did not resolve the case on the merits, the Federal 
Circuit correctly observed, and thus did not operate as a final judgment.88  After 
all, the district court could simply lift the stay when the case was decided at the 
appellate level and the counterclaims would return to active litigation.  Stays are 
generally not final89 and dispositions that fail to resolve pending counterclaims 
                                                            
83 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
84 Apparently at the parties’ behest, the district court attempted to ripen the claim construction 
order for appellate review by staying the other claims in litigation.  See Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc. 
(Nystrom I), 339 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The litigation began with an action alleging that 
TREX had infringed Nystrom’s patent on a particular kind of curved exterior wood flooring.  
Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc. (Nystrom III), 580 F.3d 1281, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  The curving of the 
flooring was slight enough that it was still comfortable to walk on, but large enough to allow water 
to drain and for the boards to be easily stacked.  Id.  TREX countered with allegations of patent 
invalidity and non-infringement.  Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1348. 
85 Id. at 1349.  While the district court had entered a partial summary judgment, it did not certify 
the finality of that judgment as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1351. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1350. 
88 Id. at 1351. 
89 Cf. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996) (stay order based on abstention 
doctrine was appealable as “final decision” because it effectively put the litigants out of court.); 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (stay order 
appealable as “final decision” because only issue in federal forum was that which would be 
resolved in state court, therefore ending litigation in federal forum). 
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also fail the final judgment rule.  To accept this mode of review, the Federal 
Circuit noted, would represent a departure from settled precedent and the ban on 
piecemeal litigation.90  The decision therefore might be considered as giving the 
requirement for a final order a “technical construction.”91 
 The desire for appellate review was no doubt sharpened by the Federal 
Circuit’s practice of closely evaluating claim construction decisions.  Empirical 
studies of the Federal Circuit suggest that the reversal rate on claim construction 
questions approaches 40%.92  This compares with an appellate reversal rate in all 
civil proceedings in the federal system that hovers at around 20%.93  While 
accounts differ as to why the Federal Circuit so frequently reverses on claim 
construction matters, one component may be that claim construction rulings, 
including fact-based questions related to them, are reviewed de novo by the 
Federal Circuit.94  Such a reversal rate could influence the parties’ willingness to 
settle on the basis of a trial court’s claim construction decision.  If we assume that 
a party in the position of Nystrom has an infringement claim worth $10 million,95 
and a 40% chance of overturning the district court’s claim construction decision, 
and the prospect of substantial trial expenses, the incentives to seek immediate 
review seem obvious.  Even the defendant, TREX, might prefer immediate 
appellate review, knowing that the case cannot settle so long as Nystrom views 
                                                            
90 Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1350. 
91 See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (the requirement of finality 
is to be given a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
92 See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 240 (Federal Circuit finds at least one wrongly construed term 
in 38.8% of cases). 
93 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 
150 (2002) (80% affirmance rate). 
94 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
95 Damages for patent infringement are those “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in 
no event less than a reasonable royalty . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  The floor of “reasonable 
royalty” damages means that the plaintiff may be able to recover a large damage award even if he 
or she does not practice the invention to the same extent as the defendant (or at all).  Although 
Nystrom was a working carpenter, Nystrom III, 580 F.3d at 1282, and likely did not intend to 
manufacture wood flooring on a large scale, if TREX was found to have infringed, Nystrom’s 
damages would have been calculated on TREX’s production, not Nystrom’s.  The court can 
increase such damages “up to three times . . . .”  Id. 
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itself as owning a patent infringement claim that it values at $4 million.96  For 
TREX, an appellate rejection of the plaintiff’s claim construction may provide a 
cheaper way to end the litigation than trial on the issues remaining after the 
district court’s disposition. 
 Despite the parties’ shared desire for immediate review of the Markman 
ruling, existing law provides few good options.  One can hardly characterize the 
claim construction question as sufficiently divorced from the merits to bring the 
collateral order doctrine into play.  Nor can one find the elements of a denial of 
injunctive relief in the decision (even though plaintiffs will occasionally include 
requests for injunctive relief in their infringement complaint and even though an 
adverse claim construction decision necessarily reduces the practical prospects for 
securing such relief).  Mandamus does not seem appropriate as a way to review 
the merits of the claim construction order97 nor does it seem possible to 
characterize the decision as a partial summary judgment of the kind that would 
bring into play the district court’s power under Rule 54(b) to declare such a 
judgment final for purposes of permitting execution and appellate review.98  
Perhaps the most promising approach would be for the district court to certify, 
under § 1292(b), that the decision involves a controlling question of law as to 
which there may be grounds for disagreement and as to which appellate review 
will speed the ultimate resolution of the dispute.99   In some ways, this seems 
especially appropriate; claim construction requires the district court to answer an 
unsettled question of law (as the claims at issue have not been previously 
construed), and its resolution will clearly move the litigation forward 
                                                            
96 See supra Part II.B0. 
97 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia 542 U.S. 367, 379 (2004) (Mandamus "is 
a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes.  The traditional use of 
the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to 
confine the court against which mandamus is sought to a lawful exercise of its prescribed 
jurisdiction.") (internal quotation marks, internal citations, and internal modifications omitted). 
98 FED R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) 
(absent other important reason for granting certification, claim appealed under 54(b) should be 
separable from remaining claims in that appellate court would not have to decide the same issues 
more than once even if there were subsequent appeals); Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Bruner, 
259 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2001) (highlighting importance of separability for 54(b) 
certification). 
99 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) authorizes such review for the regional circuits, and § 1292(c)(1) 
authorizes review by the Federal Circuit of appeals authorized under §§1292(a)-(b) if it would 
ordinarily have jurisdiction over the appeal.  See supra note 14. 
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significantly.  The Federal Circuit, however, has discretion over whether or not to 
permit such an appeal, and “[s]uch appeals are rarely granted.”100 
 Yet despite this lecture on the first principles of finality, the Federal 
Circuit’s Nystrom opinion confirms the viability of an alternative mode of 
procuring interlocutory review that appears functionally identical to the district 
court’s approach.  In the course of describing how the district court could have 
taken steps to facilitate appellate review, the Nystrom court mentioned dismissal 
of the invalidity counterclaims.101  But the surprising feature of the opinion was 
its apparent suggestion that even a dismissal of the counterclaims without 
prejudice would suffice to create the sort of finality needed to support appellate 
review.102  What the appellate court appears to have contemplated was the 
following process:  after the claim construction decision cut the heart out of the 
plaintiff’s infringement allegation, the district court would enter summary 
judgment as to those allegations.  Instead of staying the pending invalidity 
counterclaims, the district court would instead dismiss them without prejudice.  
Such an approach would dispose of all pending matters and, at least in the view of 
the Federal Circuit, satisfy the final judgment rule.  Indeed, following dismissal of 
the appeal in Nystrom I, the parties returned to district court.103  The court entered 
the suggested order, dismissing the counterclaims without prejudice, and the case 
returned to the Federal Circuit for appellate review of the merits of the claim 
construction issue and the associated grant of summary judgment.104  The Federal 
Circuit in Nystrom II had no difficulty in concluding that the final judgment rule 
was satisfied by the dismissal of the counterclaims.105 
 Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s approval of this approach to 
appellate review, one can fairly ask if the without-prejudice dismissal of the 
counterclaims differs in substance from the stay order that the court treated as 
non-final in Nystrom I.  After all, the without-prejudice designation assumes that 
                                                            
100 Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1351. 
101 Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1351. 
102 For a discussion of the circuit split regarding whether a without-prejudice dismissal provides 
the finality necessary for immediate review, see supra note 63. 
103 See Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc. (Nystrom II), 424 F.3d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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the dismissal does not operate as an adjudication on the merits to which 
preclusive effect will attach.106  That means that the counterclaims of invalidity 
remain alive and subject to re-activation through the filing of claims or 
counterclaims.  In particular, if the plaintiff were successful on appeal in Nystrom 
II in securing a reversal of the district court’s adverse claim construction decision 
and the reinstatement of his infringement case, the defendants would apparently 
be free to reinstate their invalidity counterclaims.  As a practical matter, then, the 
without-prejudice dismissal operates in much the same way as the stay order.  The 
counterclaims go into hibernation, pending the resolution of the appeal on claim 
construction, but can return to active litigation depending on the outcome.  
Indeed, the defendants would apparently be free to re-assert their claims of 
invalidity even if the plaintiff failed to secure the reversal of the adverse claim 
construction ruling.107 
 Despite its curious features, we think the Nystrom decision may 
underscore the importance of party autonomy in determining when to make 
available interlocutory review.  Rather than its analysis of technical finality, we 
think the key to the Nystrom decision lies in the fact that the district court and the 
parties apparently agreed that it would ultimately advance the resolution of the 
dispute if they could secure an appellate resolution of the claim construction issue 
before taking the case to trial.  Given the salience of claim construction, the 
comparatively high cost of patent trials in relation to the cost of patent appeals, 
and the Federal Circuit’s relatively high rate of appellate reversal, one can predict 
that parties will often have trouble settling their disputes on the basis of a trial 
court’s claim construction determination.  Recognizing this, the district court 
judge in Nystrom was attempting to work with the parties to resolve a matter he 
considered important to the ongoing case, but the court of appeals refused to hear 
the appeal.  Our proposal would promote the district court judge's authority by 
                                                            
106 Cf. Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001) 
(distinguishing between adjudication on the merits, to which preclusive effect attaches, and 
without-prejudice dismissal).  On the meaning of “on the merits,” see Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving 
Cases “On The Merits”, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407 (2010). 
107 See Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943) (counterclaim for declaratory judgment of 
invalidity survives finding of non-infringement of the original claim).  In addition, there would be 
no issue of the claim of invalidity being time-barred.  The main purpose of declaratory relief 
regarding invalidity “is to allow [someone potentially liable for infringement] to know in advance 
whether he may legally pursue a particular course of conduct.”  Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 
585, 592 (D.C. Cir 1976).  Therefore, the ability to get declaratory relief lasts as long as there is 
the potential for infringement, generally until the patent expires.  See Erie Technological Products, 
Inc. v. JFD Electronics Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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allowing him to certify the parties’ request for interlocutory review on a matter 
that would benefit from immediate appellate review.108 
2.   Particularity to Facilitate Early Evaluation of Novel 
 Claims 
 Litigation over novel theories of liability may also produce situations in 
which the parties jointly prefer an early appellate resolution of a question of law.  
One can see the logic of a joint desire for appellate review reflected in the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mitchell v. A & K.109  There, the plaintiff suffered 
grievous personal injuries at the hands of armed robbers while he was waiting 
outside the defendant’s warehouse to unload his truck.110  Illinois law clearly 
imposed a duty on landowners to reasonably guard against known threats posed 
by the unlawful conduct of third parties.111  But Illinois law had not previously 
extended that duty to those, like the plaintiff, who were assaulted on a public 
street adjacent to a private warehouse.112   The case thus turned on whether the 
duty of the defendant extended to events taking place on public property over 
which the defendant’s employees exercised a degree of control as part of their 
warehouse operation.113  As matters developed, the district court granted a motion 
to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, and the Seventh Circuit upheld 
that decision on appeal.114  One puzzle arises from the question why the plaintiff 
chose to set forth the nature of the truck’s relationship to the warehouse in such 
detail, detail that virtually invited a motion to dismiss.115  The plaintiff might have 
survived a round of motions’ practice (at least in those pre-Iqbal days) by simply 
                                                            
108 That district court judges might view appellate courts as a resource to resolve important issues 
resembles Professor Cooper’s conception that trial judges might come rely on appellate courts in a 
“mature” judicial system.  See supra note 23. 
109 573 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978). 
110 Id. at 431. 
111 Id. at 433 (citing Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 50 N.E.2d 497 (Ill. 1943)). 
112 Id. at 433. 
113 Id. at 431, 437. 
114 Id. at 431–32, 438. 
115 See id. at 431 (complaint detailed “A & K's practice, custom and habit over a period of several 
years” of using public thoroughfare as “an extension of the receiving dock area”). 
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alleging that the truck was parked on premises that the defendant used as a 
warehouse.  Why did the plaintiff choose to plead in detail? 
 One answer to the puzzle of detailed allegations may lie in the nature of 
the legal issue that the case presented.  To be sure, the parties might dispute the 
factual question of what amount should be awarded as compensation to the 
injured trucker.  But those sorts of disputes often yield to effective settlement 
negotiations, particularly after discovery has been taken of treating physicians and 
other expert witnesses.  As long as the legal issue remained open, however, the 
case would predictably defy ready settlement.  If the district court and the 
defendants were right, and Illinois law recognized no duty, the case had no value 
at all.116  If the plaintiff was right, by contrast, the verdict might well reach into 
the millions of dollars; breach of duty and resulting injury seem perfectly 
straightforward.  Initially, one might suppose that the plaintiff would prefer to 
plead generally with a hope of securing a nuisance settlement (even if the legal 
claim were unavailing).  But the plaintiff might have also preferred to secure an 
early determination of the legal question, confident that the case would settle for a 
substantial sum if the court recognized the existence of a duty.  Such a desire for a 
legal determination could explain the detailed allegations in the plaintiff’s 
complaint, allegations apparently framed to set the stage for an evaluation of the 
legal issues.  The plaintiff (or his lawyers) may have sought to defer their 
investment in the discovery expenses needed to bring the case to trial until after 
the appellate court upheld the viability of the legal theory. 
Mitchell suggests that a more subtle factor might lend support to the 
suggested model of agreed-upon appellate review.  In a case like Mitchell, just as 
in the case of Nystrom, the district court judge may well recognize that the parties 
share an interest in securing interlocutory review at the appellate level.  Under 
current law, the desire to facilitate such review may exert subtle pressure on the 
district court’s evaluation of the defendant’s motion to dismiss in a close case.  
Dismissal not only removes the action from the court’s docket, it also provides a 
final judgment suitable for appellate review by the court with essentially final 
                                                            
116 In such a case, the parties might agree to appellate review of a district court order denying the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss (despite the fact that the order would be considered a non-final 
decree).  Both parties have an incentive to economize on the costs of litigation.  Plaintiffs may not 
want to spend money to take a case to trial only to have the theory of liability overturned on 
appeal; better to know the legal viability of the action at an earlier stage.  Defendants, similarly, 
might well prefer to settle the case and avoid the costs of litigation once the federal courts 
determine that the claim has legal merit.  With their shared interest in avoiding litigation costs that 
might prove unnecessary either way the legal question comes out, both the parties and the federal 
system might well benefit from interlocutory review.  See supra, Part II.B. 
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authority over the viability of a novel claim.117  Our suggested approach would 
allow the parties (and district courts) to agree to appellate review, thus making it 
clear that the district court need not dismiss in order to facilitate speedy appellate 
resolution of the legal question.  With the prospect of agreed-upon appellate 
review, district courts might feel less inclined to ripen close cases through 
dismissal, thereby removing a possible source of subtle bias in the district court’s 
decisional process. 
 We believe that a desire to secure an appellate court evaluation of the 
merits of a novel legal claim can help to explain a part of the otherwise puzzling 
tendency of plaintiffs, in the pre-Twombly-Iqbal world, to set forth their claims 
with greater particularity than the rules would have then required.  Many 
commentators have noted the puzzling persistence of fact-pleading in a setting 
where the rules required only that the complaint notify the defendant of the nature 
of the claim.118  Of course, Iqbal confirms that notice alone will no longer suffice; 
the plaintiff must plead enough non-conclusory factual information to satisfy a 
standard of plausibility.119  To the extent the plaintiff in Mitchell sought to hasten 
a definitive legal ruling, the case allows us to see why particularity may have 
made sense for plaintiffs even before the Supreme Court found a version of it 
lurking in Rule 8.  If the parties’ joint desire for legal clarification explains a part 
of particularity phenomenon, it suggests that Twombly-Iqbal may not dramatically 
                                                            
117 Of course, a denial of a motion to dismiss would not appealable until the final judgment has 
been entered.  See Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. Telechem Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 2010). 
118 See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 
(1998); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 
(2003); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, In Their Words: Attorney Views About Costs 
and Procedures in Federal Civil Litigation 28 (Federal Judicial Center 2010) (collecting quotes 
from practicing attorneys about their decision not to plead with more specificity than notice 
pleading would require). 
119 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 556 (2007)).  See also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and The Regulation of 
Court Access, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 873 (2009) (major impact of Twombly . . . is not so much what it 
says about the pleading standard, but rather what it says about discovery costs and settlement 
leverage as well as the ineffectiveness of case management more generally.”); Richard A. Epstein, 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions To Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 79 (2007) (Twombly applied the same rationale for applying the tend-
to-exclude standard for a motion to dismiss that it had applied to summary judgment in Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986): “the basic facts alleged in the 
complaint cannot amount to a credible case of the ultimate fact . . . .”). 
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alter the degree of particularity one can expect to find in the complaints of 
plaintiffs bringing novel claims.  Rather, as others have suggested, the new and 
potentially disruptive feature of Twombly-Iqbal may be its introduction of a 
plausibility standard that goes beyond notice and particularity to require non-
conclusory allegations that tend to show some support for the claims.120 
3.  Settlement Agreements that Provide for Appellate 
 Adjudication  
 Parties sometimes stipulate that their settlement of a dispute will depend in 
part on the way an appellate court resolves an issue that arose in the course of 
litigation.  For example, in John Doe 1 v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,121 the 
defendants appealed from the denial of motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment.  Prior to seeking interlocutory review, the parties had structured a 
“high/low” settlement that involved: (1) an initial settlement payment of $10 
million by the defendants; (2) an agreement to seek certification of interlocutory 
review; and (3) a possible additional payment of up to $17.5 million depending on 
the outcome of the appeal.122  Such an agreement helps to confirm that the parties 
will sometimes agree that the settlement of a dispute can best be facilitated by the 
appellate resolution of a legal issue on which the district court cannot decisively 
rule.  Such agreements also suggest that the parties’ calculation of settlement 
ranges can depend on predictions about the likely outcome of appellate 
litigation.123 
 High/low agreements have become an accepted feature of practice at the 
trial level; such agreements typically provide that the amount of the settlement 
                                                            
120 Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 821, 823 (2010) (the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal  “invent[ed] a new and foggy test for 
the threshold stage of every lawsuit, [and therefore] have destabilized the entire system of civil 
litigation.”); Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves In The 
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852, 857 (2008) 
(“no one quite understands what [Twombly] holds” because the opinion “replaced the ‘no set of 
facts’ language [from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),] with a new standard grounded in 
‘plausibility’” while eschewing “any notion that it was imposing a heightened pleading 
requirement . . . .”). 
121 571 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2009). 
122 Id. at 932. 
123 See supra Part IIB. 
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will depend on the jury’s resolution of the case.124  The example of Doe v. Abbott 
Labs provides some evidence that these agreements now include appellate 
contingencies as well.  But the use of high/low agreements on appeal has proven 
controversial; indeed, some appellate courts have refused to assert appellate 
jurisdiction on the ground that a dispute framed by a high/low agreement does not 
present a justiciable dispute.125  While we understand the appellate courts’ 
concern with the parties’ ability to purchase a judicial precedent, we view 
appellate high/low agreements as essentially benign and deserving of 
encouragement in most cases.  (We explore the problems of justiciability in Part 
III below.)  Such agreements certainly confirm our intuitive and theoretical 
perception that the parties consider the cost of appellate review and the likelihood 
of appellate reversal when evaluating the wisdom of settling the case or taking it 
to trial.  As with the other evidence in this section, appellate high/low agreements 
tend to confirm our claim that parties often share an interest in interlocutory 
review and courts often, but not invariably, attempt to make such review available 
to them. 
4. Judicialization:  The Shift from Jury to Judicial 
 Resolution  
If a variety of real-world scenarios already display features of agreed-upon 
appellate review, we think that the number of situations in which the parties (and 
the system) can gain from party-based interlocutory review will likely continue to 
                                                            
124 In a high/low agreement, plaintiff and defendant agree to set a floor and a ceiling for damages.  
The jury hears the case, but the contract specifies that the amount changing hands will depend on 
whether the jury renders a verdict for the plaintiff or defendant.  Such an agreement allows a 
plaintiff to ensure that she can recover at least something from the action, even if the jury returns a 
defense verdict.  On the other hand, the agreement protects the defendant from an especially large 
damage award, especially one that might exceed liability insurance coverage.  See Malick v. 
Seaview Lincoln Mercury 940 A.2d 1221, 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (high/low 
agreement is a contract and subject, therefore, to traditional rules of contract interpretation); 
Cunha v. Shapiro, 837 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (treating high/low agreement as 
settlement);  ROXANNE BARTON CONLIN & GREGORY S. CUSIMANO, 3 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 
33:26; Prescott et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  Another type of settlement 
agreement is the Mary Carter agreement, where the plaintiff settles with some of the defendants 
before trial, but remains in the suit.  The agreement requires the plaintiff to reimburse the settling 
defendants up to a specific amount from plaintiff’s recovery from other (non-settling) defendants.  
See Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 586 F.3d 358, 365 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2009); Booth v. Mary Carter Paint 
Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). 
125 See e.g., Gator.com v. L.L. Bean, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005).  The case is discussed infra 
Part IIIB.  
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grow over time.  This section documents a trend toward what we call 
judicialization—the judicial transformation of fact questions (previously sent to 
the jury) into issues of law for the judge to resolve.  We saw one example in the 
patent field, where the Supreme Court approved the switch to the judicial 
resolution of issues of claim construction.126  Others examples of judicialization 
abound, and with them have come new demands for interlocutory review.  
Following judicialization, the resolution of important issues often occurs before 
trial or on appeal rather than in connection with jury deliberations.  Decisive 
resolution of important issues in the pre-trial stage of litigation virtually invites an 
application for interlocutory review.  In addition, and more subtly, judicialization 
almost invariably alters the degree of deference accorded the district court 
decision by the appellate court.  Rather than deferential review of a jury’s 
resolution of disputed fact questions, judicialization creates issues of law on 
which the appellate courts will provide the final word.127  We suspect the parties 
will continue to seek readier access to decisive rulings on these issues of law from 
appellate courts. 
Qualified Immunity 
The Court’s well-known decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald represents a 
textbook case of judicialization.128  There, the Court altered the test for qualified 
immunity in constitutional tort litigation, ending the fact-bound inquiry into the 
official’s mental state and shifting to an assessment of whether the officer violated 
“clearly established” legal norms.129  Under the old approach, disputes over 
official immunity often necessitated a jury trial to resolve the subjective good 
faith of the officer as a matter of fact.  The Harlow Court shifted from a 
subjective to an objective inquiry, transforming the issue of immunity into a 
matter of law to facilitate summary judgment.130  This change in immunity law 
                                                            
126 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
127 See, e.g., Cybor Corp., v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“claim construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on appeal”); Bradley v. 
Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1994) (application of the Daubert framework subject to de 
novo review in court of appeals). 
128 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
129 See id. at 818 (extending immunity to officials so long as they do not violate clearly established 
federal law).  For a critique of the one-size-fits-all standard of qualified immunity, see John C. 
Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259 (2000). 
130 See Harlow, 475 U.S. at 815–16 (emphasizing the need for an objective standard to facilitate 
summary adjudication of insubstantial claims). 
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worked a fundamental alteration in the litigation of constitutional torts.  Shortly 
after Harlow came down, the lower federal courts began to insist that the plaintiff 
furnish allegations detailed enough to support a conclusion that the government 
official violated clearly established norms.131 Eventually, the Court would 
confirm this conclusion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, concluding that its plausibility 
standard applied to all claims, including constitutional tort claims against high 
government officials.132  One can see the conclusion of this transformative series 
of decisions in the Court’s description of the issue in Iqbal:  did the plaintiff plead 
sufficient factual matter that, if taken as true, “states a claim that [government 
officials] deprived him of his clearly established constitutional rights.”133  By 
casting the burden of pleading on the plaintiff, the Court facilitated the use of the 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to secure an early determination of the viability of the 
plaintiff’s legal theory and the plausibility of the claim. 
An interesting change in appellate practice accompanied Harlow’s 
judicialization of the qualified immunity standard.  In 1985, the Court ruled that 
government officials could seek interlocutory appellate review of non-final 
decisions rejecting motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.134  
Although such orders were not technically final,135 the Court found in Mitchell v. 
Forsyth that they satisfied the terms of the collateral order doctrine. 136  The 
decision was, to say the least, something of a departure from established doctrine.  
The collateral order doctrine applies when the district court conclusively resolves 
an important issue, separate from the merits, and that cannot be effectively 
                                                            
131 See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (collecting examples of lower court decisions that 
applied a heightened pleading standard to constitutional tort claims).  In Siegert  itself, the 
plaintiff’s allegations of malice apparently met the standard of Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but the lower court found that a more demanding pleading standard applied to claims 
seeking to overcome qualified immunity.  Id. at 232. 
132 Iqbal therefore requires that the district court judge make the fact-bound decision of whether 
the plaintiff has “nudged his claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 
133 Id. at 1943. 
134 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
135 For the classic definition of technical finality, see Caitlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945) 
(defining technical finality as an order that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for 
the court to do but execute the judgment). 
136 472 U.S. 511 at 530 (1985) (extending government officers a right to interlocutory appellate 
review of decisions that reject a qualified immunity defense). 
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reviewed after a final judgment.137  Decisions rejecting a qualified immunity 
defense may well satisfy the conclusive and importance prongs of the analysis, 
but they do not turn on questions separate from the merits and they do not evade 
review.  After all, following the Court’s refinement of qualified immunity law in 
Harlow, the existence of the immunity depends almost entirely on the merits of the 
plaintiff’s constitutional claim.  Only claims to vindicate clearly established rights may 
proceed to judgment.  Immunity issues thus overlap with the merits to a substantial 
degree.  They also present questions of law that an appellate court can review after a final 
judgment.  The Court worked around these doctrinal rough patches by re-
conceptualizing qualified immunity for purposes of review in the federal system 
as a right not to stand trial;138 so viewed, the right was portrayed as one that could 
not be effectively vindicated without review of the immunity issue during the pre-
trial phase of the litigation.139 
Mitchell’s provision for interlocutory review provides an interesting 
window on our proposal.  Resolution of the qualified immunity issue will play a 
central role in the prospects for settlement.  In such cases, especially where 
anticipated trial costs are high, the plaintiff and the defendant might have a shared 
interest in securing an early determination of the legal sufficiency of the 
plaintiff’s claim; we can thus imagine agreed-upon interlocutory review had the 
Court not made such review available as of right for government officials.  We 
might also predict that the routine availability of interlocutory review will lead to 
the assertion of some relatively frivolous appeals by government officials who 
wish to delay the trial.  One might see some evidence of the Court’s impatience 
with such appeals in Johnson v. Jones, where the Court unanimously cut back on 
the scope of collateral order review for relatively fact-bound qualified immunity 
                                                            
137 Id. at 546. 
138 One might assume, based on this conception of qualified immunity as an immunity from trial, 
that the state courts would owe a similar obligation to provide interlocutory review of rejected 
qualified immunity claims.  But the Court did not agree.  See Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 
916–17 (1997) (rejecting the argument that state courts must make available interlocutory review 
of rejected claims of qualified immunity in the context of a § 1983 claim against state officials).  
Because the federal government removes Bivens actions to federal court as a matter of course, the 
state courts would predictably have little opportunity to evaluate the need for interlocutory review 
of a rejected qualified immunity defense by a federal officer.  See John F. Preis, Alternative State 
Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 762  n.199 (2008). 
139 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525–26 (qualified immunity doctrine is meant to protect government 
officials from the “costs of trial or the burdens of broad-reaching discovery in cases where the 
legal norms the officials are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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issues.140  Finally, one might sensibly predict that the prospects for the settlement 
of Bivens actions will improve sharply following a decision definitively rejecting 
an officer’s immunity defense.  A recent study suggests, in fact, that plaintiffs 
secure a higher settlement rate in Bivens litigation than has been previously 
supposed; 141 even Iqbal’s claims were reportedly settled after the plaintiff 
amended his complaint on remand to satisfy the Court’s more demanding 
pleading standard.142 
Reliability of Expert Testimony 
 Two Supreme Court opinions shifted, at least partially, the responsibility 
for determining the credibility of testimony from the jury to the judge.  The 1993 
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. held that the district 
court judge had a gatekeeping responsibility to determine whether scientific 
testimony of expert witnesses was reliable and relevant enough to be put in front 
of a jury.143  In doing so, the Court “recognize[d] that, in practice, a gatekeeping 
role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the 
jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.”144  In Kumho Tire Co., 
Ltd. v. Carmichael, decided in 1999, the Court expanded this gatekeeping role to 
include not just scientific testimony, but also to any testimony requiring 
“technical” or “other specialized” knowledge.145  Of course, the prerequisite for 
                                                            
140 See 515 U.S. 304 (1995). Justice Breyer wrote for a unanimous Court in concluding that an 
immediate appeal was not available from an order denying an official’s immunity-based summary 
judgment motion.  Id. at 313.  Unlike the order in Mitchell, which involved an interpretation of 
law and its application to an agreed-upon set of facts, the order in Johnson was based on a trial 
judge’s finding that there was sufficient factual matter in the summary judgment record to create a 
genuine issue for the jury to resolve.  Id.  To such an order, the Court found that the collateral 
review doctrine did not apply:  it was too fact-bound (unlike the legal question addressed in 
Mitchell v. Forsyth); it was not really separate from the merits in the sense that the same sort of 
issues could well arise after the trial; and it presented issues of factual detail that the district court 
was better suited to address than the appellate court.  Id. at 314–15. 
141 See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences 
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. (2010) (reporting a success rate in Bivens 
litigation of approximately 30%). 
142 E-mail from Alexander Reinert, Attorney for Javaid Iqbal to James Pfander (August 17, 2010) 
(on file with author). 
143 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
144 Id. at 597. 
145 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
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the Daubert/Kumho evaluation—does the testimony involve scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge—is itself necessarily a question for the judge.  
Daubert and Kumho created a new pre-trial battleground where litigants attempt 
to knock out each other’s experts, not through the traditional tools of cross-
examination, but before they appear before a jury.146 
 As with other instances of judicialization, the Daubert test for expert 
witnesses creates situations in which the parties might sensibly demand 
interlocutory review, as the Seventh Circuit decision in Fuesting v. Zimmer 
illustrates.147  In suing for personal injuries, the plaintiff (Fuesting) contended that 
the manufacturer of his prosthetic knee (Zimmer)148 had defectively designed the 
sterilization process of the implant.149  The key witness in support of Fuesting was 
Dr. Pugh, an expert who testified that Zimmer’s faulty sterilization procedures 
caused the implant to fail.150  Before trial, Zimmer attempted to have Dr. Pugh 
excluded as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 
Daubert.151  The district court denied the motion in limine and the trial then 
began, resulting in a jury finding for Fuesting.152 
 The Seventh Circuit reversed the Daubert ruling of the district court.153  
Conducting a de novo review of the district court’s determination, the court found 
that the Daubert inquiry was inadequate because although Dr. Pugh had the 
requisite credentials, his methodology did not have the necessary indicia of 
                                                            
146 See Sandra F. Gavin, Managerial Justice in a Post-Daubert World: A Reliability Paradigm, 
234 F.R.D. 196, 197 (2006). 
147 421 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2005) (Fuesting I); 2010 WL 271728 (7th Cir. 2010) (Fuesting III).  
Like Nystrom, the case appeared more than once in the court of appeals.  Id.  Even prior to 
Daubert, commentators noted that using tools such as ADR to resolve scientific issues might 
facilitate settlement.  See Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 193 (1991) (finding there may 
be a role for judges obtaining agreement to innovate regarding ADR solutions to scientific issues). 
148 Fuesting I, 421 F.3d at 530. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 532. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 537. 
44 Pfander & Pekarek Krohn   
reliability.154  The court therefore remanded for a new trial.155  At the second trial, 
Fuesting put forth a new expert, Dr. Rose.156  This time, the district court 
excluded the testimony of Dr. Rose.157  Without the testimony of Dr. Rose, 
Fuesting was unable to show causation, and the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant.158  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that 
Dr. Rose’s testimony was properly excluded and affirmed the decision of the 
district court.159  Reflecting its perception that the admissibility of expert 
testimony was now a matter for the court to resolve, the Seventh Circuit 
conducted its own independent analysis of whether Dr. Rose’s testimony met the 
Daubert test.160 
 The Seventh Circuit’s handling of Fuesting nicely illustrates the way 
judicialization can increase the demand for interlocutory review.  Like the novel 
legal theory in Mitchell v. A & K, novel expert theories of causation may be 
decisive in complex products liability and medical malpractice cases.  If the case 
goes to the jury, acceptance of the expert’s testimony provides a sound basis for 
liability.  If Daubert forecloses admission of the expert’s testimony, by contrast, 
and no other expert can be identified, then the plaintiff cannot get to the jury.  
Immediate review of the initial (non-final) decision to allow Dr. Pugh to testify 
could have saved the parties the cost of an expensive trial and could have 
highlighted the need for the plaintiff to identify another expert.  Depending on the 
prospects for locating an expert to fill Dr. Pugh’s shoes, the parties might have 
consented to such interlocutory review, knowing that the Daubert issue would 
                                                            
154 Id. at 535. 
155 The court initially remanded with instructions to direct a verdict for the defendant.  Id. at 537–
38.  On rehearing, the court vacated the part of the opinion directing the district court to enter 
judgment for the defendant, finding that the proper remedy, based on Unitherm Food Systems, 
Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006), was to grant a new trial.  Fuesting v. Zimmer, 
Inc., 448 F.3d 936, 937 (7th Cir. 2006) (Fuesting II). 
156 Fuesting III, 2010 WL 271728 at *2. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at *5. 
160 Id. at *3–4. 
Review by Party Agreement  45 
remain a threat to any plaintiff’s jury verdict.161  We cannot say that the parties 
would have agreed to such review in this case, given our uncertainty about the 
parties’ actual valuations of the case and their perception of the likelihood of 
appellate reversal.  But we can easily imagine that Daubert issues, like those in 
Fuesting, could give rise to situations in which agreed upon appellate review 
would make sense to both parties. 
 Other examples of judicialization abound.  We can see evidence of similar 
trends in such far-flung fields of law as antitrust law,162 patent litigation,163 and 
elsewhere.164  Even where the federal courts have made no change in the balance 
                                                            
161 Of course, one might argue that interlocutory review could present problems of piecemeal 
review to the extent it allowed the plaintiff to put forth a succession of witnesses (or 
methodologies) until it found one the appellate court would accept.  For a variety of reasons, we 
do not envision a problem of serial appeals.  Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has any 
incentive to lead with weak witnesses; rather, they will tend to offer their strongest witness first.  
(To the extent that a party has several equally strong witnesses, they will often present them as a 
group, thus enabling the district court to evaluate all the witnesses in a single proceeding.)  That 
may well have been the case in Fuesting; the plaintiff apparently hoped that Dr. Pugh, alone, could 
carry the plaintiff’s burden on causation and only proffered the testimony of Dr. Rose after Pugh 
was rejected.   In any case, the parade-of-witness problem arises only if the plaintiff perceives the 
defendant’s challenge to any particular witness as posing a serious risk of appellate reversal. As 
with other examples of agreed-upon appellate review, such review of Daubert issues will likely 
target those that most clearly warrant review.  In any case, the requirement that both the parties 
and the district court agree should limit the ability of one party (or even both parties) to game the 
system. 
162 Because antitrust law limits what inferences can be drawn from ambiguous evidence, the 
determination of summary judgment motions can be very fact bound.  The judge must, therefore, 
compare the reasonableness of the alleged conduct to that of independent action by the defendants.  
See Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 
(requiring the Court, in determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact “to 
consider the nature of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to its implementation.”). 
163 While it is not yet clear, the Supreme Court’s holding in KSR Int'l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., may be 
an indication that the question of obviousness, including perhaps the factual underpinnings, is one 
for the judge, and not the jury.  See 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (reiterating that “[t]he ultimate 
judgment of obviousness is a legal determination”); see also Meng Ouyang, Note: The Procedural 
Impact of KSR on Patent Litigation, 6 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 158,  159–62  (2009) (citing John F. 
Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure in the Judiciary, 
106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 37 (2007), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/duffy.pdf as believing that KSR 
moved the question of obviousness from a jury to a judge question, and Judge Matthew Kennelly 
as believing that it had not). 
164 For example, the Seventh Circuit found that because the controlling Illinois state law treated 
the question of piercing the corporate veil as one of equity, it was to be determined by a judge and 
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between judge and jury, the growth of federal statutory law has tended to provide 
a more detailed legal framework within which fact-finders must operate in 
resolving issues of federal liability.165  With the growth of statutes and the legal 
questions they inevitably pose comes a corresponding demand for appellate 
review, as parties seek the answers from the only body that can finally resolve the 
issue.  Our proposal attempts to address this demand for review by empowering 
the parties and the district court to make it available when they all agree that it 
would help resolve the case. 
III. PREDICTABLE CONCERNS WITH PARTY-DRIVEN APPELLATE REVIEW 
Despite our perception that both the parties and the system have much to 
gain from agreed-upon interlocutory review, we can imagine objections to making 
such review more readily available.  We address those objections in this part of 
the article.  We first tackle a set of concerns that may attend any proposed 
expansion of interlocutory review, concerns driven by the policies underlying the 
final judgment rule.  We next consider the justiciability concerns that might 
appear to arise from the fact that both parties have agreed to seek review.  We 
show that the fact of agreement alone does not create a feigned case problem 
under Article III.  Finally, we consider two possible concerns that might arise 
from what we will call the likely incidence of such agreed-upon review.  Some 
may oppose the proposal on the ground that it will burden the appellate courts 
with too many cases; others on the ground that the proposal has no practical value 
because the parties will too rarely agree to interlocutory review.  We say to both 
groups:  let’s give the proposal a trial run and see what happens.  The possible 
need for ongoing evaluation suggests that there might be an advantage in adopting 
the proposed rule through the rules advisory process.  The Judicial Conference 
Committee on Civil Rules—or the newly formed joint Civil/Appellate 
Subcommittee166—can provide ongoing review and oversight of new rules of 
interlocutory review, adjusting course in light of experience. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
not a jury.  See International Financial Services Corp. v. Chromas Technologies Canada, Inc., 356 
F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2004). 
165 On the rise of statutes, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 
(1982) (describing an “orgy” of statute making and a resulting “statutorification” of American 
law); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 
(1994). 
166 See Report of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, May 9, 2009, at 7 (noting formation of 
the subcommittee, and including on its list of topics to consider the manufactured finality 
doctrine). 
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A. Erosion of the Final Judgment Rule 
One can question our suggested reliance on party agreement to identify 
issues for interlocutory review on the familiar basis that it would undermine the 
final judgment rule.  Although this argument applies to any proposed expansion 
of interlocutory review, it deserves serious consideration.  In evaluating the 
possible concern with erosion, we note that scholars have long taken the view that 
the final judgment rule should operate less as an absolute prohibition and more as 
a presumptive guidepost.  Thus, a leading casebook explains that the goal has 
been to “identify those trial rulings that should be eligible for an immediate 
appeal rather than have their appeal postponed until a final judgment disposes of 
the entire dispute.”167  In this section, we will briefly sketch the elements of the 
final judgment rule and explain why our proposal will yield appeals that do not 
offend the rule. 
The classic justifications for the final judgment rule have been to avoid the 
premature, fragmentary, and repetitive appeal of matters first resolved at the trial 
court level.168 If we break down these elements, we can see a number of 
considerations at work.  As for the concern with prematurity, appellate courts 
rightly expect that some appeals might be avoided or obviated if the final 
judgment rule were applied.169  Thus, to return to our example of the non-final 
district court rejection of a proffered statute of limitations defense, some 
defendants might win on the merits at trial, thus avoiding liability and obviating 
the need for appellate resolution of the limitations issue.  As for the concern with 
fragmentation, appellate courts often feel that they can better address the 
fundamental issues in a case if they see the issues against the backdrop of a full 
                                                            
167 DANIEL J. MEADOR, THOMAS E. BAKER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 49 (2d ed. 2006). 
168 See id. at 49. 
169 The possibility that an issue might be obviated by further proceedings at the trial court level has 
played a somewhat inconsistent role in Supreme Court decisions cutting back on the final 
judgment rule.  Compare Radio Station WOW, Inc. et al. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 127 (1945) 
(allowing review of a non-final state court decision on the ground that further proceedings could 
not obviate the federal question) with North Dakota State Board v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 
U.S. 156, 163–64 (1973) (emphasizing that further proceedings might obviate the federal question 
as a factor supporting a finding of finality) and Construction Laborers’ Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 
542, 549–551 (1963) (noting that the union might, in theory, prevail in a state court trial but 
concluding that this prospect of obviation should not prevent immediate review of the state court’s 
rejection of the union’s claim that federal labor law foreclosed state court authority to adjudicate a  
labor disputes). 
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record; fragmentary appeals may not bring into view all of the issues that might 
properly influence an appellate decision.170  As for the concern with repetition, 
appellate courts rightly resist interlocutory review of issues that could return to 
the appellate docket later in the form of an appeal from a final judgment.171  The 
Supreme Court’s decision to curtail interlocutory review of fact-bound issues of 
qualified immunity was based in good measure on concerns with the prospect of 
repetitive review.172 
 We do not believe that agreed-upon interlocutory review will offend these 
elemental features of the final judgment rule.  Consider first the problem of 
obviation.  One can certainly imagine situations in which defendants will succeed 
at trial, thus obviating any need for appellate resolution of legal defenses to 
liability.  But such defense verdicts on liability will likely occur in situations in 
which both parties view the case on liability as something of a toss-up.  In such 
cases, the prospect of interlocutory appellate review does not create prospects for 
settlement where they did not .previously exist; indeed, interlocutory review may 
reduce the expected settlement value of the case from the plaintiff’s 
perspective.173  This comports with our intuition that plaintiffs in doubtful cases 
                                                            
170 For examples of the somewhat formulaic invocation of the importance of a full record, see In re 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Without a full record  and without the 
benefit of an adversarial proceeding, the appellate court would be in a particularly poor position to 
pass on the propriety of the district court's exercise of discretion.”); Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 
1363, 1372 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Even though the district court decided the matter on a motion for 
summary judgment, we cannot say that the development of a full factual record at a trial on the 
action on the notes might not be of assistance to us in deciding the issues raised on this appeal.”). 
171 The Court’s collateral order doctrine was framed with this problem in mind.  Thus, in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), the Court emphasized that the 
question at issue—the plaintiff’s obligation under state law to post a bond before pursuing a 
shareholder’s derivative action—was separate from the merits and could not be effectively 
reviewed after the entry of judgment at trial.  The requirement that collateral orders must remain 
separate from the merits and evade review after final judgment has remained part of the doctrine.  
See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (denial of motion to dismiss on 
grounds of forum non conveniens was not sufficiently separate from the merits to warrant 
immediate review under collateral order doctrine). 
172 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1995) (refusing to allow collateral order review of 
a district court decision denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds; reasoning that the fact-bound nature of the summary judgment motion would 
mean that the same issue and facts could well arise in the wake of a final judgment). 
173 In Part II.B, we considered the settlement prospects in a case where the plaintiff and defendant 
both assessed the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict at 90% if a pre-trial ruling stood, but assigned 
different values (80% and 50% respectively) to whether the ruling would be upheld on appeal.  
Under those assumptions, we found that the parties would likely agree to interlocutory review to 
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on liability will tend to press forward to a jury verdict in an effort to secure a 
settlement offer from risk averse defendants who might agree to settle to cap their 
potential liability and reduce the threat of a runaway jury.  Thus, both our 
intuition and our simple model predict that the parties would be unlikely to agree 
to interlocutory appellate review when they anticipate a strong likelihood of a 
defense verdict that would obviate the need for appellate review.  
Just as we do not anticipate that the parties will agree to interlocutory 
review when the case affords a realistic prospect that further proceedings will 
obviate the need for review, we do not view fragmentation and repetition as likely 
stumbling blocks to our proposal.  Parties will tend to agree on the need for 
interlocutory review only where the case turns on a relatively clear-cut issue on 
which the appellate court has the final say.  The more clear-cut the legal question, 
the less it will likely benefit from a more fully developed record.  Moreover, 
clear-cut legal questions do not pose a threat of repetition; once settled, the legal 
disposition will control the remainder of the litigation.  In assessing an expert’s 
qualifications (as in our hypothetical case)174 or a novel claim for relief (as in the 
case of Mitchell v. A& K),175 the appellate court will resolve the matter once and 
for all (subject to the possibility of Supreme Court review).  Whatever conclusion 
the jury reaches as to liability (assuming the case returns there for trial 
disposition), we would not ordinarily expect the appellate court to revisit legal 
conclusions reached in the course of interlocutory review.176 
                                                                                                                                                                  
enable them to settle the case without proceeding to trial.  When we assume, by contrast, that both 
parties reckon the plaintiff’s success at trial at only 50% if the ruling stands and 20% if it is 
reversed, the introduction of interlocutory review has a different effect.  Under the final judgment 
rule there would be a settlement range as plaintiff will accept anything over 28 [(.8 x .5 x 100) – 
10 – 2 = 28] and defendant will pay up to 37 [(.5 x .5 x 100) + 10 + 2 = 37].  Immediate review of 
the ruling might put the plaintiff in a worse bargaining position.  While the settlement range would 
go up if the court of appeals upholds the ruling (plaintiff would accept anything over 40 [(.5 x 
100) – 10 = 38] and defendant will pay up to 60 [(.5 x 100) + 10 = 60]), it would go down if the 
ruling is reversed.  The settlement range after a reversal would be between 10 [(.2 x 100) - 10 = 
10] and 30 [(.2 x 100) + 10 = 30]. A well advised plaintiff would either reject interlocutory review 
in this situation, or consent to interlocutory review only as a part of a pre-appeal settlement to 
hedge against the risk of losing the appeal.  
174 See supra Part II.B. 
175 573 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978).  See supra Part II.C.2 . 
176 To be sure, the Nystrom case illustrates the possibility that appellate court resolution of some 
fact-bound questions, such as the claim construction decision on which the parties sought 
appellate review, may produce some fragmentation and repetition.  That case has made at least 
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B. Feigned Case Problems Under Article III 
 Among the many other limits it imposes on the exercise of judicial power, 
Article III forbids the federal courts from hearing feigned or collusive cases.177  
As a consequence, the federal courts may not proclaim the law except in cases of 
“honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights.”178  The requirement of 
adversariness might appear to pose an Article III barrier to our proposal.  After 
all, we propose to allow the parties to procure an appellate court’s resolution of a 
legal question by agreeing with one another that such review would be mutually 
beneficial.  Some courts might take the view that the parties’ agreement as to the 
need for appellate review violates the prohibition against feigned or collusive 
cases and thus presents a jurisdictional bar to the exercise of appellate review.  In 
cases where the parties enter into settlement agreements, conditionally resolving 
their dispute subject to the appellate court’s resolution of an outstanding issue, 
justiciability issues might appear especially acute. 
 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gator.com v. L.L. Bean illustrates the 
concern.179  In a cease-and-desist letter, clothing manufacturer L.L. Bean 
                                                                                                                                                                  
three trips to the Federal Circuit already.  But these extra trips are likely due to the unavailability 
of interlocutory review on the claim construction.  The first appeal was dismissed because it 
improperly attempted to get interlocutory review of the initial claim construction.  Nystrom I, 339 
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The second, addressing the claim construction on the merits, reversed 
on the construction of one of the claim terms.  Nystrom II, 424 F.3d 1136, 1146–48 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  While this construction made clear that Nystrom could not win under a theory that TREX 
had literally infringed, he still attempted to pursue the case under the theory that TREX had 
infringed under the “doctrine of equivalents.”  The district court ruled, however, that because 
Nystrom’s had stipulated to non-infringement, he had waived his doctrine of equivalents 
argument.  Nystrom III, 580 F.3d 1281, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  This led to the third appeal, where 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the doctrine of equivalents argument 
had been waived.  Had Nystrom been working under our rule, however, two of these appeals 
would have been avoided.  First, it would only have taken one trip to the Federal Circuit to get a 
definitive ruling on the claim construction.  Second, because getting that ruling would not have 
required Nystrom stipulating to non-infringement, and there would have been no issue of whether 
he had waived his doctrine of equivalents argument. 
177 On the feigned case prohibition, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. 
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 94-100 (6th ed. 2009); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 50–51 (4th 
ed. 2003). 
178 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (quoting Chicago & G.T. Ry. v. Wellman, 
143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)). 
179 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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demanded that Gator.com stop interfering with Bean’s website by opening pop-up 
advertisements for competitor Eddie Bauer.180  In response to Gator’s action for 
declaratory relief, Bean moved to dismiss on the ground that the federal district 
court in northern California lacked personal jurisdiction over it.181  After the 
district court granted the motion, Gator sought review.182  A panel of the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, concluding that Bean was subject to both general and specific 
jurisdiction in California.183  After en banc review was granted and the case was 
fully briefed and argued, the parties informed the court that they had reached a 
settlement of the underlying litigation.184  Instead of asking the court to dismiss 
the appeal, the parties specifically requested that the court provide a ruling on the 
personal jurisdiction issue.185  The settlement provided for a winding down of 
Gator’s practices and a payment to compensate Bean; it also provided for Gator to 
pay an additional $10,000 if the appellate court found that the district court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over Bean.186  The Ninth Circuit found that the settlement 
mooted the controversy, and therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.187  The ruling might appear to cast some doubt on the viability of 
high/low settlement agreements that turn on the appellate court’s resolution of a 
disputed legal issue.188 
                                                            
180 Id. at 1127. 
181 Id. at 1127–28. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1134 (W. Fletcher, J. dissenting). 
184 Id. at 1128 (majority opinion). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1132. 
188 Subsequent decisions treat the Gator.com dismissal as reflecting the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
that the personal jurisdiction issue did not involve the merits of the case but was merely a side 
issue.  See John Doe 1 v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing 
Gator.com as a case in which a settlement of the merits of the declaratory judgment action mooted 
the case, leaving only the “side issue” of personal jurisdiction).  While this gloss helps narrow the 
reach of the doctrine, the Gator.com decision nonetheless threatens the viability of contingent 
appellate settlement agreements, at least to the extent that the issue the parties wish to press on 
appeal can be described as collateral to the merits.  Many threshold procedural motions, such as 
motions to transfer or dismiss for improper venue or jurisdiction, as well as many dispositive legal 
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 While the Ninth Circuit decision may appear to draw some support from 
recent developments in vacatur practice following a finding of mootness, we do 
not believe the analogy holds and we question the mootness conclusion in 
Gator.com.  Findings of mootness on appeal in the federal system have long given 
rise to the practice of remanding the action with a directive that the lower court 
vacate its prior judgment.189  Relying on this practice, institutional litigants began 
to settle cases on appeal in an effort to moot them and procure the vacatur of an 
opinion below that the litigant viewed as antithetical to its institutional interests.  
The Court rejected this practice of erasing judgments through settlement, ruling in 
United States Bancorp v. Bonner Mall that mootness by way of settlement does 
not typically “justify vacatur of a judgment under review.”190  Underlying the 
Court’s decision was the perception that parties should not be allowed to purchase 
the negation of precedents they dislike through the settlement process.191  To the 
extent that the Ninth Circuit regarded Bean as attempting to purchase a favorable 
precedent, one can understand the court as having attempted to prevent 
gamesmanship comparable to that involved in United States Bancorp. 
 Ultimately, however, we believe that the settlement practice criticized in 
United States Bancorp differs fundamentally from that at issue in Gator.com.  To 
see the difference, consider the position of the parties at the time they negotiate 
their settlements.  In the United States Bancorp setting, the parties negotiate a 
settlement for the purpose of procuring the vacatur of a decision rendered in the 
context of an adversary proceeding.  They act, in short, to undo the binding 
quality of a judicial decision that they have come to regard as inconvenient.  In 
the Gator.com setting, by contrast, the parties act not to undo an existing 
precedent but to secure the appellate court’s resolution of a disputed issue of law 
                                                                                                                                                                  
defenses, such as a limitations defense, might be characterized as a side issue to the merits.  As a 
result, the Gator.com restriction poses a threat to the effective implementation of agreed-upon 
interlocutory review, at least when it occurs in the context of a contingent appellate settlement 
agreement. 
189 See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). 
190 U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).  For a critical 
evaluation of the practice, anticipating the Supreme Court’s conclusion, see Jill Fisch, Rewriting 
History:  The Eradication of Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 589 (1991). 
191 See United States Bancorp, 340 U.S. at 26 (“Petitioner's voluntary forfeiture of review 
constitutes a failure of equity that makes the burden [to show entitlement to the extraordinary 
remedy of vacatur] decisive, whatever respondent's share in the mooting of the case might have 
been.”).  
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about which they have long disagreed.  They can argue to the court but they 
cannot control the contours of the ultimate decision.  The threat underlying the 
United States Bancorp decision, that parties might settle their way out from under 
the precedential effect of federal decrees, thus seems entirely absent from the 
Gator.com setting where the parties continue to press for a binding appellate 
resolution that will control both the resolution of their own dispute and provide a 
possible precedent for future disputes. 
Instead of drawing an analogy to the United States Bancorp setting, we 
think that the justiciability issues in Gator.com can be more aptly analogized to 
the declaratory judgment action.192  In many declaratory judgment proceedings, 
the parties recognize that they have a genuine dispute about a question of law that 
will require judicial intervention.  For example, an insurance company might 
refuse to honor its contractual duty to defend and indemnify after concluding that 
its insurance contract has lapsed.193  Both the company and the insured might 
recognize the existence of an open question under the terms of the particular 
insurance contract.  They might further recognize that they cannot resolve the 
issue without the intervention of a neutral decision maker.  They might agree to 
arbitrate their dispute or to initiate a declaratory judgment action to clarify the 
contract’s applicability.194  Both parties might recognize the need for judicial 
intervention, and might agree to secure it, but that joint interest in settlement of 
the dispute would not make the case a feigned proceeding.  So long as they 
genuinely contest the contractual issue, and have adequate incentives to do so, 
                                                            
192 The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act allows the federal courts to issue declaratory judgments 
in cases of “actual controversy.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201.  At one time, the federal courts appeared 
reluctant to entertain declaratory judgment proceedings as a result of concerns with their 
justiciability under Article III.  For an account, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 177, at 56.  But the 
Court promptly upheld the act’s constitutionality as applied to a fairly concrete dispute over the 
interpretation of an insurance contract.  See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). 
193 See 14 STEVEN PLITT, JOSHUA D ROGERS, DANIEL MALDONADO, LEE R RUSS & THOMAS F 
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 202:3 (3d ed. 1997) (“In case of doubt or dispute as to whether 
there is a duty to defend, based on dispute over whether an insurance policy affords coverage for 
the conduct alleged in the complaint against the insured, a declaratory judgment action or motion 
may be brought to make the determination.”); cf. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green 
Professional Associates, PLC, 495 F.3d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 2007) (declaratory judgment action by 
general liability insurance provider against out-patient drug treatment facility contesting duty to 
defend claim by estates of patient and another third-party who perished in car accident caused by 
patient after he left treatment center after receiving methadone treatment). 
194 See Travelers, 495 F.3d at 268. 
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their agreement as to the need for a legal resolution should not bar the federal 
courts from intervening.195   
Parties who agree on the need for appellate review occupy much the same 
position toward one another as litigants who agree on the need for a declaratory 
judgment proceeding.  That is, the parties continue to dispute the issue of law they 
wish to present to the appellate court, but agree on the need for its resolution.  Our 
proposal would, in effect, authorize the parties to seek a declaratory judgment 
from the appellate court upon agreement that the appellate resolution would 
advance the resolution of their dispute.  So long as the parties have an adequate 
financial incentive to pursue their opposing views of the issue on appeal, 
continued litigation at the appellate court level does not appear to threaten the 
requirement of adversary presentation.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has twice 
upheld the justiciability of disputes in the wake of the parties’ adoption of 
contingent appellate settlement agreements.196  The entry into such settlements 
did not moot the cases on appeal, in the Court’s view, because the amount of 
money changing hands between the parties was structured to turn on the Court’s 
resolution of a disputed legal question.197  District courts, under our proposal, 
would have authority to evaluate the terms of any contingent appellate settlement 
agreement and satisfy themselves as to the existence of that degree of adversity 
                                                            
195 Cf. id. at 271 (although neither party raised jurisdictional issues, the court raised the issue sua 
sponte and found that the exercise of jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action was an 
abuse of discretion).  While the court found that the resolution of this declaratory judgment action 
would not settle the controversy or help to clarify the legal relationships between the parties, this 
may be a dubious determination.  See id.  Once the insurance provider clarified its duty to defend 
the insured, it could then enter into settlement negotiations with the third-party estates.  Until it 
was clear, however, that the insurance company had any duty to defend, those settlement 
negotiations would be impossible. 
196 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (confirming justiciability of immunity issue on 
appeal, notwithstanding settlement agreement under which Nixon would pay $142,000 if 
absolutely immune from suit and $170,000 if only qualifiedly immune); Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (upholding the justiciability of a class action appeal, despite a 
settlement agreement that provided that the plaintiffs would receive either $400 apiece, or nothing 
at all, depending on the outcome of the appeal). 
197 In Nixon, the former President paid Fitzgerald $142,000, in exchange for which, Fitzgerald 
agreed to accept liquidated damages of another $28,000 if the Supreme Court found that President 
Nixon was not entitled to absolute immunity.  See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 743–44.  The Court found 
that both parties still had “a considerable financial stake in the resolution of the question presented 
in [the] Court” and therefore the case was not moot.  Id. at 744.  Similarly, in Havens, the Court 
found that an agreement liquidating damages in case of success on appeal did not moot the claims.  
See Havens Realty,  455 U.S. at 371. 
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needed for further litigation under Article III.  Appellate courts could also inquire 
into the situation if doubts arose as to the existence of adversity sufficient to 
sustain their appellate jurisdiction. 
C. The Incidence Problem 
 We expect that uncertainty about the incidence of agreed-upon 
interlocutory review will lead to questions about our proposal.  (By incidence, we 
mean to refer to the frequency with which the parties and district courts will 
approve interlocutory appellate review.)  Without concrete data on the expected 
incidence of party-driven review, we can offer only our best guess that our 
proposal will do more good than harm.  Some might point to the lack of incidence 
data in arguing that party-agreements will inundate the appellate courts with a 
new collection of appeals, perhaps on mundane or routine questions, and will 
siphon away scarce appellate resources from more pressing matters.  Others might 
use the lack of incidence data to express the opposite concern:  that the parties 
will all too rarely agree to appellate review, thus making the proposal more of an 
academic exercise than a practical tool for the resolution of disputes.  We 
acknowledge the concern; one of the reasons we labeled this Article a preliminary 
analysis was to capture a measure of our own uncertainty and to invite more 
scholarship. 
 We can nonetheless offer some (preliminary) comments on the incidence 
problem, focusing first on the threat to appellate dockets.  Both our model and our 
assessment of such interlocutory appeals as that in Nystrom give us some 
confidence that the parties will not burden the appellate courts with a flood of 
appeals on matters that would otherwise work themselves out at the trial stage of 
the process.  Economic interests will tend to encourage the parties to agree on 
interlocutory review of those dispositive legal issues that they expect to survive 
(and potentially threaten) the lower court’s resolution of liability issues in the 
case.  Precisely because the parties anticipate that those dispositive issues will 
survive for appellate adjudication, they will occasionally have incentives to get 
them addressed sooner rather than later.  As a consequence, we would expect 
substantial overlap between the issues that the parties identify for interlocutory 
review and those that they view as likely candidates for review in the wake of a 
final judgment.198  It thus seems likely that our proposal will not alter the mix of 
issues brought to the appellate courts so much as the timing of appellate court 
review.  In Nystrom, we observe, the appellate court agreed to make interlocutory 
                                                            
198 As discussed above, in high-stakes litigation, the likelihood of appeal is great, and therefore the 
question is not about whether to appeal, but when.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
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review available of claim construction issues that were likely to have survived any 
disposition of the case at the trial level.199 
 If we can rely on the parties’ self-interest to identify serious issues for 
interlocutory appellate review that are likely to require appellate resolution in any 
case, can we also predict that they will agree with sufficient frequency to justify 
the adoption of a new rule?  Here, we point first to the fact of increasing 
judicialization, a trend that suggests that the number of dispositive legal issues 
will continue to grow and produce greater need for interlocutory review.  We also 
observe that the relative costs of trial and appellate litigation tend to create 
conditions favorable to growing demand for interlocutory review.  At the trial 
level, the growing cost of e-discovery, increased reliance on expert witnesses, and 
other factors have tended to drive up the cost of obtaining a jury’s resolution on 
liability.200  At the appellate level, by contrast, the trend runs in the opposite 
direction; such technological innovations as computerized legal research and 
word processing have reduced the relative cost of appellate practice over the past 
generation.201  Not surprisingly, then, we find a strong demand for interlocutory 
review in precisely those fields of litigation that are characterized by relatively 
high trial practice costs and relatively inexpensive appellate review.  Patent 
holders and other intellectual property litigants, in particular, have pressed 
                                                            
199 If there are many claims at issue, and even one construction appears to disfavor the eventual 
loser at trial, an appeal seems likely.  As seen anecdotally, through the case of Fuesting III, 2010 
WL 271728 (7th Cir. 2010), similar issues may arise in the area of qualification of expert 
testimony.  See supra notes 157170 and accompanying text. 
200 On e-discovery, see John Bace, Cost of E-Discovery Threatens to Skew the Justice System, 
Gartner RAS Core Research Note G00148170, at 2 (Apr. 20, 2007) (Justice Breyer noting that the 
large cost of e-discovery could “limit use of courts to only those who have the tools and money” 
and “drive out of the litigation system a lot of people who ought to be there.”), available at 
www.h5technologies.com/pdf/gartner0607.pdf.  On expert witness fees, see Anthony v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 106 F.RD. 461, 465 (D.R.I. 1985) (“Our citizens' access to justice, which is at the 
core of our constitutional system of government, is under serious siege. Obtaining justice in this 
modern era costs too much. The courts are among our most treasured institutions. And, if they are 
to remain strong and viable, they cannot sit idly by in the face of attempts to loot the system. To 
be sure, expert witness fees are but the tip of an immense iceberg. But, the skyrocketing costs of 
litigation have not sprung full-blown from nowhere. Those costs are made up of bits and pieces, 
and relaxation of standards of fairness in one instance threatens further escalation across the board. 
The effective administration of justice depends, in significant part, on the maintenance and 
enforcement of a reasoned cost/benefit vigil by the judiciary.”). 
201 See Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals Might 
Do To Help Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1321, 1322–26 (1994) (noting the impact of 
technology on reducing costs to the courts of appeals and to litigants themselves). 
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Congress in recent years for legislation that would ease their access to the 
appellate courts for interlocutory review of dispositive legal issues.202   
In addition, some decisions, such as claim construction and the admission 
of expert testimony may be the subject of cross-motions.  The resulting decisions 
may leave both sides unhappy about some portion of the ruling.  In such cases, the 
parties might agree to interlocutory review if both believe the result will both 
provide clarity and strengthen their position.  Finally, even in situations where one 
party clearly prevails on a particular ruling, the losing party might be willing to 
put enough money on the settlement table to convince the winner to agree to 
interlocutory review.  For example, consider a defendant that loses a motion for 
summary judgment.  The defendant would like to immediately appeal this 
decision, and will likely not settle without such an appeal.  But the plaintiff would 
likely not agree to interlocutory review, having just won at an important stage of 
the litigation.  The defendant could, however, offer to settle, with the full amount 
of the settlement being determined by the result of the interlocutory appeal.203 
 We recognize that the greater the likely incidence of agreed-upon review, 
the more likely appellate courts will oppose our proposal.  As a general matter, 
appellate courts have experienced greater growth in their dockets in recent years 
than have the district courts.204  To cope, appellate courts have adopted a variety 
of measures:  they have increased their reliance on per curiam dispositions,205 
                                                            
202 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 10(b) (2009) (allowing interlocutory 
appeals of claim construction rulings); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8(b) 
(2009) (allowing interlocutory appeals of claim construction rulings “if the district court finds that 
there is a sufficient evidentiary record and an immediate appeal from the order (A) may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, or (B) will likely control the outcome of the 
case, unless such certification is clearly erroneous.”). 
203 Parties to such agreements may seek review by joint motion for interlocutory review under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b).  See, e.g., John Doe 1 v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 
2009).  As discussed previously, however, the appellate court has the discretion to refuse to take 
such appeals.  See supra note 14. 
204 See POSNER, supra note 75, 100–01, Table 4.2 (cases filed in district courts grew 372% 
between 1960 and 1983, while cases filed in courts of appeals grew 823%; cases filed in district 
courts dropped 1% between 1983 and 1995, while cases filed in courts of appeals grew 67%). 
205 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that for the twelve-month period 
ending September 30, 2009, 64.1% of decisions of the courts of appeals were unsigned.  Judicial 
Business of the United States, 2009 Annual Report of the Director, table S-3. 
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granted fewer oral arguments,206 released fewer opinions for publication as fully 
precedential,207 and made greater efforts to resolve matters through alternative 
dispute resolution.208  The perception that appellate courts have experienced 
greater docket growth in recent years surely helps to explain their reluctance to 
accept certified questions for interlocutory review under section 1292(b).209  We 
can predict that our proposal, in omitting any provision for the appellate court to 
screen appeals, will prove somewhat controversial among appellate judges. 
 Yet we worry that the introduction of a screening mechanism would 
undermine a central purpose of our proposal.  As we explained at the outset, our 
proposal to rely on the parties to identify issues for interlocutory appellate review 
offers the advantages of both categorical and discretionary review.   Categorical 
review avoids the necessity for appellate screening, a practice that can often 
consume scarce appellate resources without producing any decision on the merits 
of a divisive legal issue.210  Discretionary review tends to target issues that 
deserve appellate attention, but imposes a screening burden on either the trial or 
appellate court.211  By relying on the parties to identify issues deserving of 
interlocutory review and the district court to ensure that systemic interests receive 
due attention, our proposal offers some of the advantages of both approaches.212  
Introduction of a layer of appellate screening would complicate the process of 
                                                            
206 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that for the twelve-month period 
ending September 30, 2009, 71.5% of cases were terminated on the merits without oral argument.  
Judicial Business of the United States, 2009 Annual Report of the Director, table S-1.  This is 
compared with 59.9% of cases for the same period in 1997.  Judicial Business of the United 
States, 1997 Annual Report of the Director, table S-1.  See also POSNER, supra note 75, at 161–62 
(discussing “the curtailment of both the length and frequency of oral argument.”). 
207 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that for the twelve-month period 
ending September 30, 2009, 83.2% of decisions of the courts of appeals were unpublished.  
Judicial Business of the United States, 2009 Annual Report of the Director, table S-3.  See also 
POSNER, supra note 75, at 162–75; Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of 
Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373–74 (1995) (noting that many 
unpublished decisions “would have been the subject of full-fledged opinions a few decades ago.”). 
208 See supra note 59. 
209 See supra note 14. 
210 See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra notes 54, 56 and accompanying text. 
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docketing an appeal and raise the cost of appellate review to the parties by 
requiring them to brief both the discretionary issue and the merits.  It would, 
moreover, enable the appellate courts to narrow access to their dockets, thus 
duplicating the disappointing results that have obtained under section 1292(b)’s 
provision for certified review. 
 IV. CONCLUSION 
Apart from the relaxation of the final judgment rule, much has changed 
since the nineteenth century, and much was foreseen by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.  While Holmes denied that “general principles” can decide “concrete 
cases,”213 he also observed that judges work by induction reasoning from the 
bottom up.  By this, Holmes meant that judges draw their general principles from 
the consensus reflected in prior decisions.214  Holmes thus described a process of 
generalization that bears some resemblance to what we observe today as courts 
and legislatures insistently go about the business of transforming issues of fact 
into matters of law.  With this modern shift towards judicialization, we observe an 
accompanying demand for judicial dispositions; juries can no longer provide a 
decisive answer to many of the questions that divide litigating parties. 
With the rise of general principles, the growing cost of trial practice, and 
the preference for settlement in the shadow of the law, parties increasingly 
demand access to appellate review at all stages of the litigation process.  We can 
see this growing demand reflected in the many tools of interlocutory review that 
courts and rule makers have already made available to the parties.  These tools 
represent a significant departure from the nineteenth century’s final judgment 
rule, which rather inflexibly barred any pre-judgment appellate oversight of 
actions for money damages.  Rather than a world of inflexible finality, we now 
inhabit a world of presumptive but episodic finality, where arguments for 
exceptions to the final judgment rule receive respectful attention. 
                                                            
213 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
214 In perhaps his best known aphorism, Holmes proclaimed that “experience,” not logic, was the 
life of the law.  O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1879).  In 
rejecting deductive logic, Holmes was arguing for induction, or bottom up reasoning, as the key to 
the development of general principles. He found merit in the common law because “it decides the 
case first, and determines the principle afterward.”  Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 
PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983) (quoting O.W. Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 44 HARV. 
L. REV. 725 (1931)).  For all his skepticism about logic, Holmes remained quite keen on the 
importance of identifying general principles; he simply rejected the syllogism as the basis for their 
derivation.   
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In this Article, we have argued that the parties should be given a measure 
of control over their own access to interlocutory review.  Parties will, needless to 
say, refuse to agree on such review in the great majority of cases; plaintiffs will 
likely reject interlocutory appeals that they regard as more likely to delay than to 
edify.  But in cases where a question of law strikes the parties as one that could go 
either way, when the question of law can invalidate or reconfigure much of what 
lies ahead in the trial court, and when the cost of appellate review seems modest 
in relation to the cost of preparing the case for submission to the jury, parties will 
have good reason to seek an early appellate court answer to the question.  We 
have argued that, for systemic reasons, such questions will almost always warrant 
interlocutory review.  We thus suggest a rule that would authorize a district court 
to certify an issue for interlocutory review upon agreement of the parties. 
 
